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I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE QUESTION
iberal jurisprudence seldom gives much notice of its imminent
decay, which typically either develops in the guise of prudent
policy or is concealed by ignorance and intellectual neglect. In
such insidious fashion, the popular crusade for "victims' rights" has quietly
attained troubling prominence among contemporary trends in law and
policy. In the course of advancing such apparently reasonable ideas as
victim-impact testimony, sex-offender registration, and victim restitution,
victims' rights has thrust upon contemporary jurisprudence and criminal
justice irrational, illiberal doctrines disturbingly common to Nazi jurispru-
dence and consistent with the ideas of its chief legal ideologist, Carl
Schmitt. Even more disturbingly, victims' rights arguments share with
Schmitt and his fellow Nazis a deep antipathy to rule of law and a penchant
to cloak this antipathy in a specious claim to "perfect" or to be consistent
with rule of law. On one level, the victims' rights agenda contradicts rule
of law head-on. But on another, it also threatens to pervert the critical thrust
of rule of law by undermining both its facility to bind the contemporary
criminal justice system and its jurisprudence to a minimum of rational
norms, possibly shattering the construct's capacity to insure a minimally
progressive, liberal legal system.
The doubly destructive nature of victims' rights upon liberal jurispru-
dence derives from the peculiar character of rule of law. No simple bundle
of doctrines, rule of law is a complex construct with progressive, liberal
tendencies that are accompanied by an inherent conceptual fragility. This
fragility derives from the fact that, beneath the myth that it is a strictly
formal and normatively sterile construct, rule of law contemplates an
amalgamation of formal and quite substantive norms. These norms are at
oncethe source of its progressive functions, yet intrinsically self-contradic-
tory, at odds with social reality, and quite easily reduced to self-destructive
perversion. Indeed, so conceptually unstable is rule of law that its
coherence is sustainable only when viewed dialectically, that is, viewed as
a construct which actively subordinates its more critical and contradictory
tendencies to a relatively modest, straightforward, and most of all
historically feasible agenda-that of restraining the worst excesses of
political sovereignty and displacing arbitrary decisions with rule by general
legal norms.
By virtue of such immersion in dialectic, rule of law remains, at best,
poised on a knife's edge between a facility for viable critique and a descent
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into critical incoherence.' While surely reformist and constructive,2 a
dialectical construct of rule of law can neither completely negate rule of
law's insurgent, contradictory norms, nor halt the steady stream of social
conflicts that continuously threaten to alter modest criticisms into
unrealistic and unmanageable mandates. In the hands of opportunists and
irresponsible radicals, rule of law norms are easily relieved of the
compromising tethers of dialectic and redeployed in an insolent, hyper-
bolic, and ultimately incoherent way, in total disregard of the existing
limits of legal reform. Inasmuch as rule of law implies equality, for
example, it may be converted into an historically untenable demand for
immediate and complete equality-and thereby removed from the table of
reasonable legal debate. As Schmitt's concoctions demonstrate, and as I
shall show is the case with victims' rights, such tactics allow a reactionary
destruction of rule of law to be rationalized (in the weakest sense of the
word) in the name of better realizing rule oflaw's own imminent normative
agenda.3
I This accommodating character is precisely what has allowed rule of law to
maintain relevance, as well as critical thrust, throughout nearly a century of the
welfare state-a facility that many conservative commentators had declared
impossible. On this dynamic, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE STATE AND THE
RULE OF LAW IN A MIXED ECONOMY 71-72 (1971).
2A couple of mainstream examples of such constructive work are offered by
Robert Burt and Peter Edelman. See Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The
Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741 (1987); Peter B.
Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking OurDuty to the Poor,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1987). A sign of the state of debate, the Edelman piece
contributed significantly to his disqualification, as a "radical leftist," from
nomination to the federal bench. See David Kairys, Clinton's Judicial Retreat
When Naming Judges, He Is Quick to Cave, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1997, at Cl.
3 Schmitt's general mode of argument is to call attention to the specter of crisis
and the impotency of liberal norms as traditionally articulated (e.g., as rule of law)
to prevail. See CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (Tracy B. Strong
ed., Rutgers Univ. Press 1996) (n.d.); CARL SCHMrr, THE CRISIS OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., Massachusetts Inst. Tech.
Press 1985) (1923).
For similar, contemporary "critiques" of rule of law, see, for example,
ROBERTOM. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
THEORY 52-76, 166-218 (1976). See also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1985); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 69-71
(1987); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1276 (1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward
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The necessary reliance of rule of law on the restraining force of
dialectic, coupled with the tenuousness of the dialectical form, converges
to amplify the negative impact of victims' rights. As I shall argue, victims'
rights must overcome a blatant inconsistency with rule of law. This it
accomplishes through a two-step assault on the construct: first, by
confronting rule of law directly and second, by distorting rule of law's
inner dialectical structure. In the first instance, victims' rights embraces
ideas nearly identical to Schmitt's notions of the immutability of the
"friend and enemy" relationship and his corresponding endorsement of a
jurisprudence of "decisionism" founded on a readiness to acknowledge the
"exception" to the norm, the extralegal "state of emergency," and the
general subordination of law to politics. For victims' rights, as for Schmitt,
each notion justifies the renunciation of normative, rule-oriented law.
Indeed, the victims' rights movement allies itself, as I shall show, with
policies which specifically parallel primary characteristics of Nazi law and
criminal justice, including: the immutable or biological conception of
criminality, the appeal to community and private justice, the erosion of the
legal boundaries of criminal justice, and the penchant for retroactive, ad
hoe, deeply politicized, and altogether extreme responses to crime.
In the second instance, the victims' rights agenda, like the philosophy
of Schmitt,4 styles itself as a mode of perfecting rule of law by fulfilling its
an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical
Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391 (1984).
William Scheuerman outlines the basic contours of neo-Schmittian discourse
in the introduction to his recent text on rule of law. See WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN,
BETWEEN THE NORM AND THE EXCEPTION: THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE
RULE OF LAW 6-10 (1994).
Among the clearest examinations of this kind of "critique" is Marx's persistent
analysis of various of his contemporary "radical" socialist thinkers. See KARL
MARX, THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY (C.P. Dutt & V. Chatto Padhyana eds., New
York Int'l Publishers 1936) (1846). Similar efforts to expose the hidden,
reactionary qualities of ostensibly radical critique resurface at various points in the
history of social thought. See, e.g., Georg Lukdcs, Frederich Nietzsche, in THE
LUKACS READER 246 (Arpad Kadarkay ed., 1995). For a liberal critique of such
"critical" perspectives on rule of law, see ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE (1990).
' In fact, Schmitt's own critique of rule of law suggests an awareness of its
dialectical structure. A Schmitt sympathizer describes this awareness as follows:
Schmitt came to the following conclusion about modem bourgeois politics.
First, it is a system which rests on compromise; hence all of its solutions are
in the end temporary, occasional, never decisive. Second, such
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normative agenda and transcending its contradictions. Thus, in the midst
of its headlong assault on rule of law, victims' rights dares to present itself
as a corrective of rule of law's shortcomings, in an effort merely to
"balance" the scales and achieve a higher grade of justice.
At the end of this encounter, it is the conceptual integrity and viability
of rule of law that yield to the manifest irrationality of crime and to
reckless demands in the name of victims, rather than the institutions to an
ambitious or more balanced conception of rule of law. A construct which
justifies its own destruction and which is deployed in a self-contradictory
manner cannot be usefully coherent. As with Schmitt, victims' rights
rhetoric about perfecting rule of law is revealed to be nothing but a
subterfuge, a kind of "cloak and dagger" tactic. This deception is inevita-
ble, for there is simply no hope for perfect reason, right, or justice-least of
all for the victim-to be achieved within the traditional confines of the
criminal justice system.
A detailed analysis of this complex, destructive relationship to rule of
law forms the heart of my critique of victims' rights. In developing this
topic, I undertake an essentially leftist defense of rule of law-an attitude
almost wholly foreign to contemporary American legal thought. Rule of
law arguments more typically surface to further right-wing, by modem
definitions, reactionary causes.5 Conceding to this bias, the legal left in this
country-legal realists and critical legal scholars especially-has systemati-
arrangements can never resolve the claims of equality inherent in
democracy. By the universalism implicit in its claims for equality,
democracy challenges the legitimacy of the political order, as liberal
legitimacy rests on discussion and the compromise of shifting majority
rules. Third, liberalism will tend to undermine the possibility of the political
in that it wishes to substitute procedure for struggle. Thus, last, legitimacy
and legality cannot be the same; indeed, they stand in contradiction with
each other.
Tracy B. Strong, Foreword to SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra
note 3, at xv. This perfecting ethic, I believe, accounts for Schmitt's and other
Nazis' relentless juxtaposition of modernist and romantic ideals-as though the one
contains the means ofrealizing the other. On this critique, see FRANZL.NEUMANN,
BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM 443-44
(Octagon 1963) (1944) [hereinafter NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH], and SCHEUERMAN,
supra note 3.
5 See, e.g., ALBERT DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITTION (1982); FREDERICKA. VONHAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
(1960); THE RULE OF LAWAND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA (Jeffery Sachs &
Katherina Pistor eds., 1997).
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
cally delegitimatized rule oflaw. Forwhat it is worth, this reduction ofrule
of law from the revered legal substructure of capitalism and modernity's
progressive (if historically restricted) missions to, instead, little more than
the legal scapegoat for the worst shortcomings of the age is likely
unwarranted and probably derives from a persistent unwillingness to see
rule of law dialectically and in historically contingent terms.6 In no way
does such a perspective serve any critical purpose with respect to victims'
rights.
For a more judicious, historically grounded, and eventually more
critical approach to rule of law, I reference the almost-forgotten German
legal theorist, Franz L. Neumann. Neumann was a peripheral member of
the Frankfurt School who, very much unlike his principal colleagues in that
movement, spent his intellectual life attempting in various ways to defend
rule of law, to expose its nexus to real history of his day, and to vindicate
its progressive agenda.7 In Part II of this Article, I shall draw upon
6 Although this historical-dialectical perspective on rule of law is informed by
Neumann, it is also evident to some degree in Francis Allen's analysis of
contemporary criminal justice. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OFLEGALrIY:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAw 7-13 (1996) [hereinafter ALLEN, THE
HABITS OF LEGALITY]. On the characteristics of rule of law thought, see, for
example, GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995); Gary Minda, The Dilemmas of
Property and Sovereignty in the Postmodern Era, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 636
(1991). See also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATIONOFAMERICANLAW,
1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
Indeed, Schmitt's unfortunate legacy surfaces here, too, in a"critical" insistence
that law is strictly politics anyhow. See, e.g., Schlegel, supra note 3, at 411. For
more critical scholarship on Schmitt's theory of the interplay between law and
politics, see generally Special Issue on Carl Schmitt, 72 TELOs 1 (1987).
I regard the typical leftist attitude as more evasive, and therefore reactive, than
critical. Indeed, existing liberal scholarship says next to nothing about the dire
jurisprudential implications of victims' rights. This does not mean that the existing
scholarship is totally inadequate, only that its critique is insufficiently
jurisprudential. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Essay, Victims' Rights and the
United States Constitution: An Effort to Recast the Battle in Criminal Litigation,
85 GEO. L.J. 1691 (1997); Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights,
37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985).
7 See generally SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3 (providing the most extensive
discussion of Neumann's ideas in English print). On the history of the Frankfurt
School, see, for example, MARTIN JAY, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION: A
HISTORY OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL AND THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH,
1923-1950 (1973).
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Neumann's ideas to assemble a theory of rule of law that captures the
construct's rich, often progressive, normative implications, the practical
need to configure these norms dialectically, and rule of law's resulting
historical contingency and conceptual delicacy. With fair reliance on
contemporary criminal justice scholar Francis Allen, among others, I show
in Part III the rationalizing functions that rule of law has performed in the
criminal justice context, as well as the inherent limits of these functions.
For insights into the nature of Schmittian and Nazi jurisprudence, I rely in
Part IV on a variety of sources, including Neumann and the contemporary
scholar of that jurisprudence, Ingo Miller. Thus informed, I analyze the
victims' rights movement and its agenda, and I confirm the dire implica-
tions of this relationship. Finally, in Part V, I offer a conclusion with a few
words about the prospects of achieving a rational system of victims' rights
while preserving the general viability of rule of law.
II. FRANZ L. NEUMANN AND RULE OF LAW:
HISTORY, DIALECTIC, AND GENERAL NORMS
A meaningful definition of rule of law is quite elusive.' Conventional,
popular notions of rule of law are virtually worthless as bases for critical
inquiry. Typically, such definitions forsake the construct's critical value by
reducing rule of law to mere formality or positivity, or relatedly, to the
simple ideology of capitalism.9 Alternatively, they tend toward mere
dictionary-type operationalizations, which, because they grasp rule of law
as a mere historical given and not as a concept with a dynamic practical
life, are equally without critical potential. 0 Because of a forthright concern
8 Despite rule of law's persistent currency in popular discourse, there is little
consensus or accuracy concerning its meaning. On this lack of clarity, see Ian
Shapiro, Introduction to THE RULE OF LAW 3 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
9 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. Premised on a shallow economic
determinism and associated with supposedly Marxist and critical, as well as
anarchist and radical libertarian perspectives, this approach is quite meaningless.
While doubtlessly true in the broadest sense, the vulgarity of such an attitude limits
its grasp to the crude tautology that every legal or philosophical construct owes its
basic form and substance to the historical development of capitalism, and further,
its normative theoretical yield is limited to jurisprudential nihilism about the rule
of law.
10 Typically, such definitions describe rule of law in terms of constitutionalism,
separation of powers, the segregation of civil and political society and criminal and
civil jurisdiction, the prohibition of retroactive and individualized law, and the
requirement that law be promulgated in a general, formal, and universal form and
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for legalizing the substantive norms of enlightenment and the political and
ethical agenda of modernism and liberal capitalism-the persistent search
for "reason"' in law-the task of understanding rule of law is somewhat
better accomplished by its enlightenment and classical liberal commenta-
tors, who are at least partially inclined to recognize rule of law's diverse
historical functions and the interface of its history and normativity and,
therefore, to grasp the overall complexity of its meaning."
Nevertheless, even the classical approach towards rule of law typically
fails to move decisively beyond an ambiguous, instrumental, and some-
times superficial approach to the meaning of the construct. The classical
tradition finds itself unable to sever rule of law from the extraneous
ambiguities of traditional natural law, on the one hand, or to resist the
simplifying appeal of crude positivism or formalism, on the other. In
general, the classical approach does not grasp the intricacy of the interface
that application be predictable and facially neutral. See, e.g., CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 699 (1995) (defining "rule of law").
11 See, e.g., 2JoHNLocKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690); JOHN STUARTMILL, ONLIBERTY 15 (Gerald
Dworkin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859). Or, as Rousseau writes:
If we seek to define precisely the greatest good of all, the necessary goal of
every system of legislation, we shall find that the main objectives are
limited to two only: liberty and equality; liberty, because any form of
particular subordination means that the body of the state loses some degree
of strength; and equality because liberty cannot subsist without it.
JEAN-JACQUESROUSsEAU, THE SOCIALCONTRACT 86-87 (ChristopherBetts trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1762).
For Karl Marx, rule of law comprises the foundation on which political and
civil society are separated and, therefore, the basis for the enumeration of property
rights on which grounds the alienation of labor occurs. Nonetheless, this scheme
represents "a big step forward. It may not be the last form of general human
emancipation, but it is the last form of human emancipation within the prevailing
scheme of things." KARLMARX, On the Jewish Question, in EARLYWRITINGS 221
(Gregor Benton & Rodney Livingstone trans., Vintage 1975).
Significantly, the classical attitude toward rule of law introduces the literal,
idealistic vision of rule of law-legal norms over exceptions and prerogatives-into
the realities of history and society. Accordingly, this perspective is forced to
abandon the myth of rule of law as pure formality orpositivity and to acknowledge,
instead, that the concept's most essential purpose requires (1) that it have
recognizable substantive implications and (2) that it is actually comprised of a
composite of substantive and structural norms. This attitude is very clearly evident,
for instance, in Rousseau's and especially Mill's efforts to read the
liberal/enlightenment agenda into the rule of law. See MILL, supra, at 83-85.
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between rule of law norms and their historical context. 2 Instead, among
enlightenment thinkers, as well as more contemporary liberals, the attitude
toward rule of law reduces to apriori, state of nature, and social contract
arguments and religious or moral appeals to natural law. 3 Among more
contemporary scholars, similar tendencies appear. Austin, Hart, and even
Kelsen embrace legal theories so positivist or formal, and altogether so
abstract, as to be virtually sterile with respect to substantive norms and
reductive of its historicity. Figures like Rawls and Dworkin respond with
positions that are rich with substantive norms but are cabined in abstrac-
tions and equally devoid of rigorous historical grounding. 4
Neumann, although he builds on the classical approach and especially
upon Rousseau, sets forth a definition of rule of law which is at all points
more firmly grounded in the complex historicity ofthe construct. Neumann
regards rule of law as effectively being the secular descendant of natural
law and replete with its general, progressive normativity from the outset.15
By relentlessly emphasizing the historical nexus of rule of law's essential
norms, he arrives at the following key propositions: (1) that the normativity
of rule of law is inherently both substantive and formal; (2) that generality
is the key rule of law norm; (3) that, properly construed, rule of law is in
practice fraught by instability and tension; and (4) that rule of law's
coherence depends emphatically upon its dialectical structure and a
necessary circumspection about its historical limits.' 6 These assertions,
which eventually disclose the depth of the antagonism between victims'
rights and rule of law, warrant explanation.
For Neumann, who was heavily influenced by Marx, rule of law is
unintelligible outside of its social-historical context and has a functional
12 See FRANZ L. NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law in Modern
Society, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 22-26 (Herbert
Marcuse ed., 1957) [hereinafter NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw].
13 Such tendencies are clearly evident in any survey of Hobbes, Locke, Kant,
or Hegel, for instance. See generally HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
FROM PLATO TO HEGEL (1949).
14 Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1997); and HANS KELSEN,
PURE THEORY OF LAW (1990) (notwithstanding Kelsen's neo-Kantian normative
positivism); with Ronald Dworkin, Philosophy and the Critique of Law, in THE
RULE OF LAW 147-70 (Robert P. Wolf ed., 1971); and JOHN RAWLS, ATHEORYOF
JUSTICE 235-43 (1971).
" See, e.g., FRANZ L. NEUMANN, 7ypes of Natural Law, in THE DEMOCRATIC
AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE, supra note 12, at 69 [hereinafter NEUMANN,
Types of Natural Law].
16 See id. at 69-70.
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identity with capitalism. Yet, for Neumann the relationship between rule
of law and capitalism is not one-way: "The inter-relationships of legal and
social phenomenon cannot be contested.... [The idea that] law and the
economic system stand in the relationship of form and content" is patently
erroneous.
17
Such an emphatically historical but nonmechanistic approach to rule
of law makes clear from the outset that rule of law can be reduced to pure
formality only in the mind and that any justifications of rule of law based
on such abstract conjecture as the state of nature, the social contract, or
God's will are false and unsupportable. For Neumann, rule of law
developed, instead, in a close organic interaction with the greater institu-
tions of capitalism. The institutions have structured each other. As a result,
rule of law norms converge with, and are inseparable from, the rationaliz-
ing normative agenda of modernity and capitalism in general, reflecting,
but never mechanically, its favor for formal equality, civil liberty, and so
17 FRANZL.NEUMANN, THERULE OF LAW: POLITICAL THEORYANDTHE LEGAL
SYSTEMINMODERN SOCIETY 16-17(1986) [hereinafterNEUMANN,RULEOFLAW].
Indeed, critics of bourgeois thought from Marx to Georg Lukdcs to Ian Shapiro
have consistently managed to uncover these substantive implications only thinly
veiled by the "neutrality" of liberal politics and the liberal ethos. Indeed, Georg
Lukcs regards the assumption of interrelatedness as a centerpiece of liberal
ideology. Luklcs argued quite long ago that amongst the modem, bourgeois ideals
of rule of law is the notion that "the formal equality and universality of the law
(hence its rationality) was able at the same time to determine its content"-and
further, that this is in fact an accurate, if often denied, supposition. GEORGLUKACS,
HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 107-08 (Rodney Livingstone trans., 1971)
(1968). For Shapiro, "[a]t the heart of the liberal conception of rights in all its
formulations is a pluralistic account of the good." IAN SHAPIRO, THE EvOLUTIoN
OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY 282 (1986). See generally NEUMANN, RULE OF
LAW, supra, at 4-10.
Of course, the true relationship between rule of law and its social-historical
agendas is never actually so simple. For instance, the Marxist jurist Evgeny
Pashukanis stated that bourgeois law not only "exists only in antitheses: objective
law-subjective law; public law-private law, and so on," but also tends to assume
and reflect the dominant forms of capitalist relations, the commodity form, and
legal relationships, a contractual form. EVGENY B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND
MARXISM: A GENERAL THEORY 47-64 (1989). Pashukanis closely anticipates the
distinctly Luklcian notion of ideology and of the ideology of rule of law as an
organic interrelationship of social discourse and intercourse ("superstructure") with
the substructure of capitalist production. See id.; see also Isaac Balbus, Commodity
Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy ofLaw, 2 L. & SOC'Y
571 (1977).
[VOL. 87
VICTIMS' RIGHTS
forth."8 Throughout this still ongoing process, the most vacuous norms,
even supposedly purely formal norms, attain complexity and substance
which eventually penetrate the construct's innermost structure. In reality,
then, rule of law norms are inherently determinate material norms, which
are rational, substantive, and possessed not merely of an ideological
function but also, under certain historical circumstances, revolutionary
consequences. 19
Following Rousseau, Neumann argues that it is the norm of generality
and the reign of general legal norms which capture most clearly and
effectively the rule of law's basic ambition to restrain irrational sover-
eignty. Unlike Rousseau and his ilk, though, Neumann's relentless and
altogether more sophisticated attention to the construct's complex history
uncovers its detailed, largely substantive agenda.20 Also in contrast to
Rousseau, Neumann's focus on the history of rule of law reveals its origins
in natural law and its gradual secularization by virtue, mainly, of its
functional association with capitalism and liberalism generally.21 Unlike
Austin and other vulgar positivists and unlike Kelsen, Neumann insists that
as a secular institution, rule of law nonetheless retains an endemic
substantive normativity.
"By a general law, we understand... an abstract" rule of law.22 In this
sense, generality merely reiterates the formal normativity of rule of law.
But at the outset, even this abstracting character implies certain obviously
substantive elements rooted in the functions and consequences of setting
loose abstract, general law in the real world. "[F]irst, [general] law must be
a rule which does not mention particular cases or individual persons but
which is issued in advance to apply to all cases and all persons in the
abstract; and second, it must be specific, as specific as possible in view of
its general formulation."' 3 Still closely following Rousseau, Neuman insists
that the formal structure ofgeneral law contains "a minimum of substantive
content" evident with its automatic preclusion of retroactive and individu-
alized law and a guarantee of judicial independence. 24
is See NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 185-211.
19 See id. at 4-6, 25-45.
20 Compare NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at
33-37, with ROUSSEAU, supra note 11, at 80-82.
21 See NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 28-42.
2 NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 213.
23 FRANZL. NEUMANN, The Concept ofPoliticalFreedom, in THE DEMOCRATIC
AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE, supra note 12, at 160, 165 [hereinafter
NEUMANN, The Concept ofPolitical Freedom].
24 NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 29-30; see
also ROUSSEAU, supra note 11, at 80-83. This notion of generality contemplates
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For Neumann, generality is the specific successor to the religious or
scholastic element of the old natural law in that generality lends to rule of
law a self-legitimating force. 5 Generality thereby validates law as a kind
of reified abstraction, which immediately sets rule of law apart from rule
by law and contemplates law which reigns apart from and (theoretically)
over any subjective or other institutional sovereign. The result of such a
system is a mandate for confining law to a closed system wherein only
general legal norms are law.
Consequently, as evident for instance in the Rights of Man,26 every
activity not restricted by the general law is permissible. Under rule of law,
the state may act only within the confines of law. Furthermore, only a
political sovereign's general, legal commands, articulated with due
specificity, are enforceable as rule of law; the remainder of the social and
private realm acquires freedom from sovereignty. Neumann calls this result
"juridical freedom," an ideal which is premised on the autonomous
historical development of and which in turn legally secures the classic
segregation of civil and political society.27 As such, juridical freedom
contemplates the realization ofa broadly negative notion of freedom which,
Neumann argues, had previously been the exclusive claim of traditional
natural law.28
Neumann argues that several more precise functions actually follow
from and are meaningfully effectuated by the existence of a regime of
law which is general with respect to the legal subjects it impacts and the temporal
duration of such prohibition and yet specific with respect to the categories of
conduct so affected. See, e.g., ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 6, at
84.
1 See NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 212.26 THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Ernest Rhys ed., 1915) (1791).
27 Cf MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 155-56 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds.
& trans., 1989) (1748) ("[N]o one will be constrained to do things the law does not
oblige him to do or be kept from doing things which the law permits him to do.").
The relevant parts of Articles IV and V of the Declaration ofthe Rights ofMan and
of the Citizen read as follows:
Liberty consists in the power of doing whatever does not injure another...
[its] limits are determinable only by the law .... Law ought to prohibit only
actions hurtful to society. What is not prohibited by the law should not be
hindered; nor should anyone be compelled to do that which the law does not
require.
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN arts. V, V (France
1789).
28 See NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 23-26,
31-33. On this tendency, see, for example, RAWLS, supra note 14, at 240-41.
[VOL. 87
VICTIMS' RiGHTS
general law. To negative freedom there also correspond material norms,
which include a moral or ethical, an economic, and a political/ideological
function. Of these, Neumann regards the ethical function as the only one
that is indigenous and therefore paramount to a discussion of rule of law as
such.29 Neumann writes:
From the simple proposition that there exists a presumption in favor of the
individual's freedom there follows every [ideal] element of the liberal
legal system: the permissibility of every act not expressly forbidden by
law; the closed and self-consistent nature of the legal system; the
inadmissibility of retroactive legislation; the separation of the judicial
from the legislative function. . . .The liberal legal tradition rests,
therefore, upon a very simple statement: individual rights may be
interfered with by the state only if the state can prove its claim by
reference to a general law which regulates an indeterminate number of
future cases.
30
29 "1 should stress... that the moral function transcends both the economic and
political contexts within which it operates. This is the legal value, the sole legal
value, inherent in a system so structured. All other values realized in a legal system
are introduced from outside, namely by power." NEUMANN, The Concept of
PoliticalFreedom, supra note 23, at 170. In Neumann's view, generality's success
at reconciling this basic rule of law ideal-norm over exception and
arbitrariness-with key aspects of its historical obligations is most evident on an
economic plane. Through generality, the idea of norm over exception and
arbitrariness can be reconciled organically with the basic requisites of capitalism.
Generality accommodates the rule of law to the functional demands of market
society. It does so, in particular, by lending its "disguising" ideological functions
(e.g., the veiling of inequality) and its capacity to ensure the calculability and
predictability essential to capitalist economic activity. See NEUMANN, RULE OF
LAW, supra note 17, at 213.
30 NEUMANN, The Concept of Political Freedom, supra note 23, at 165-66.
Indeed, this very logic is evident, for instance, in the Rights of Man, article 1,
which declares, "Men are born free and equal in rights," DECLARATION OF THE
RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN art. I (France 1789), and in the Declaration
ofIndependence, which declares, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights... That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted
among men," THEDECLARATIONOFINDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis
added). The difference is that the sovereignty of Neumann's rule of law, grounded
in generality, is self-executing and self-legitimating. See NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW,
supra note 17, at 45-46.
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The ethical, substantive function of general law itself operates on
several levels. Beyond juridical freedom and security, rule of law tends to
guarantee at least formal, legal equality. This follows first, in a way that is
familiar to the earliest proponents of rule of law, from the semantics of
general law. Before a regime of law which is worded generally and
interpretable on its own terms, all persons stand on equal footing and are
legal subjects to which the law is, in a formal sense at least, equally
applicable." Neumann argues, however, that generality also implies a
rather more serious ethic of equality, one which tends to transcend the
limitations of semantic generality to what Anatole France once called the
equal right to sleep beneath bridges.32 One of Neumann's struggles is
reconciling formal equality with the substantial egalitarian implications
that follow from it and yet, if given full reign, would destroy rule of law
altogether. This tension may not be soluble by legal means, but it implies
that social and legal institutions must somehow contribute to substantial
equality. This logic suggests a kind of substantive democracy and real
equality within the confines of rule of law, although not in the form of or
in conflict with specific rule of law norms.33
General law implies a preference for public law, in that the uniquely
universal form and democratic sources ofpublic law better accord with the
universal and egalitarian pretenses of general law.34 More generally, as
Neumann appears to recognize, the rule of law's function in restraining the
arbitrary, illiberal conduct of the sovereign is better accomplished when the
sovereign is requiredto articulate its commands in the transparent language
of public law and is not allowed to conceal its conduct behind the exercise
of private rights.35
31 See NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 213; NEUMANN, The Change
in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 42.
32 See ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYs ROUGE 117-18 (Calmann-Levy ed., 1925).
33 SeeNEUMANN, BEHEMOTH,supra note 4, at 443-44; NEUMANN, The Change
in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 22-24; NEUMANN, 1ypes ofNaturalLaw,
supra note 15, at 90; see also SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3, at 205-17.
3 True private law, on the other hand, has no generality; it is merely law
between the parties. See NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 19-24. See
also RAWLS, supra note 14, at 235-43, for his definition of rule of law.
35 See NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 27-29;
see also NEUMANN, The Concept ofPolitical Freedom, supra note 23, at 164-67.
The logic by which Neumann derives such norms is evident in NEUMANN, RULE
OF LAW, supra note 17, at 41-44, where Neumann extracts "auxiliary liberties"
from his basic concept of rule of law.
[VOL. 87
VICTIMS' RIGHTS
It is perhaps important to note that while Neumann's focus on the
substantive implications of rule of law is grounded in the nexus of rule of
law and history, such a historical focus tempers his vision of generality.
Nowhere does Neumann equate a regime of general law with the actual
perfection of social reason; to do so would require either a supreme
ignorance of historical facts or a notion of reason gutted of meaning and,
in the balance, violate his Marxian sensibilities. Neither does he reck-
lessly construe rule of law in terms of its full substantive implications.
Neumann's more cautious, historically sensitive aim is to relieve rule of
law of immediate, overlapping sources of internal conflict and tension.
The first of these is a conflict between the actual persistence of
political sovereignty and the rule of law. The second is a normative
tension encompassing the dual notion of law, the political and the material
notion: the omnipresence of the political, the emergency, and the
exception.36
The theory of the rule of general laws has, of course, never been fully
realized in any stage of the development of [even] competitive capitalism.
Liberal society is not a rational one, and its economy is not planfully
organized. Harmony and equilibrium are not, at any given moment,
automatically restored. Measures of the sovereign and "general
principles" are, at all stages, indispensable.37
This perspective expresses an understanding ofthe relative (or perhaps
normal) impossibility of achieving total reason under andthroughthe law.38
36 See NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 4-5, 2545; see also
NEUMANN, The Change in the Function of Law, supra note 12, at 24-25;
SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3, at 104 ("[Neumann] thinks there is a fundamental
tension between the critical, unfulfilled universalistic idea of legal equality (and the
derivative view that legal norms must be clear and general) and the deep social and
economic inequalities generated by capitalism.").37 NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 41.31 Significantly, Neumann appears to grasp, in its insinuation of such radically
substantive equality, the coexistence of generality's critical impulses with its
inherent historical limitations. Even as a merely formal, semantic idea, generality
can never be fully realized in the real world, no more than a capitalist society can
be truly democratic. Indeed, formal, semantic equality partly contradicts
substantive equality. See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3, at 207-08.
And yet, does this dilemma reflect the weaknesses of Neumann's concept of
generality or comment upon the intrinsic limitations of rule of law's coherence?
Or, is this pervasive contradiction areflection, withinNeumann'sformulations and
1998-99]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
It also comprises an indirect acknowledgment that not only a historically
sensitive but a dialectical attitude is essential to sustaining rule of law's
coherence. In an undoubtedly rather conservative manner, which Neumann
acknowledges, such vision of rule of law at least indirectly sanctions an
imperfect, ultimately irrational social order. Yet, in a very progressive way,
so construed, rule of law retains a meaningful critical thrust-meaningful,
at least, to questions about the content and structure of law where, as is
presently the case, the basic organizational contours of society are
relatively fixed.39
Here remains the key potential inherent weakness of rule of law. Rule
of law's dependency on the conflict-suspending powers of dialectic,
rule of law itself, of the vestigial and to some degree inherent irrationality of
modernity and capitalism and the powerlessness of law to fully overcome this
condition? In the end, I believe that the latter, alternative propositions are
undoubtedly true. Only a contingent legal norm precisely like Neumann's
generality can effectively confront social reality with both critical and relevant
weight. Therefore, I regard Neumann's qualified but persistent exaltation of
generality as a concession to the limits of reason in the context of rule of law. For
Neumann, it seems, generality is the centerpiece of a maximally rational rule of
law.
In this sense, then, Neumann regards the structural norms of rule of law and
generality, in particular, in the same dialectical and highly contingent fashion that
Marx and many leftist liberals came to view the vanguard norms of capitalism: as
concepts whose critical implications reached well beyond both their outermost
ideological functions and their historical context. For Marx, the quintessentially
liberal doctrines of property (e.g., the Lockean labor theory of property) and
contract (e.g., the liberal ethic of fair exchange of equals) fail to conceal completely
the fundamental contradictions within the very structure of capitalism: inequality,
unequal exchange, and, even more so, the alienation of labor. This attitude, need
it be said, is a central and consistent theme in Marx's theory. See, e.g., KARL
MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Prometheus 1988)
(1844).
In a classic exercise of immanent critique, Marx demonstrates how the liberal
conceptions ofpropertyand contractimply socialism and communism. The gradual
acceptance of this kind of immanent critique of capitalism in more respectable
liberal circles finally resulted in the likes of L.T. Hobhouse, for instance,
highlighting liberalism's rampant potential for "destructive and revolutionary
criticism" on the way to justifying the welfare-state. LEONARD T. HOBHOUSE,
LIBERALISM 14 (Oxford 1981) (1911).
39 Overall, this state of affairs represents, as Neumann ventures in one context,
a reflection in law of "the ambivalent position of modem man." NEUMANN, The
Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 39-40.
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combined with its socially and self-critical tendencies as well as the
relative institutional weakness of law, leaves it on a precarious ground.
From this position the whole construct can be tragically distorted in the
name of its own critical ambitions. In other words, dialectic stabilizes the
construct, but has no capacity to actually solidify rule of law's social
foundations. Rule of law remains at best a junior partner of the capitalist
economy and often even its politics; it is relatively more malleable and
always susceptible to their pressures. A realization of the threat posed by
this chronic instability likely drew Neumann to recognize the tenuous
nature of liberal society's support for rule of law and the real threat to rule
of law where liberal society itself is questioned.' He clearly realizes that
rule oflawis inherently vulnerable to larger, especiallypolitical-economic,
changes. When the chips are down, it is quite easy to repudiate rule of law
not just for its manifest inconsistencies, but. ostensibly in the guise of
resolving these inconsistencies. In Neumann's view, an exploitation of this
unavoidable character of rule of law and western jurisprudence generally
is a major element of Schmitt's theory and a prerequisite of the formation
of Nazi jurisprudence.41
I. RULE OF LAW AND THE
RATIONALIZATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
In the context of criminal justice there can be little question that rule
of law performs an important progressive, rationalizing function.42 This fact
40 See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3, at 98.
41Neumann's anxiety is shared by figures as ultimately disparate as Weber, von
Hayek, and Ernst Bloch, as well as Georg Lukdcs and Evgeny Pashukanis, who in
various ways forecast the demise of at least the classic, formal conception of rule
of law. See SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3, at 97-107; see, e.g., LUKACS, supra note
17, at 108; PASHUKANIS, supra note 17, at 47-64.
42 Critics of reform, like Foucault, somewhat successfully identify the in-
completeness of its agenda and the perverse tendency of reform in the penal
context in particular. Yet, to comprise a relocation of state coercion, there can also
be no doubt that the displacement of outright torture, corporeal punishment,
arbitrary process, conviction by status, lynchings, and the like has improved the lot
of criminals and accused persons, even if coercion and punishment remain the
primary features of the criminal justice system. See generally MICHELFOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISHMENT: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 30-33 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1978). On the rationalizing rule of rule of law
in the criminal context, see generally SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980).
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underlies several important rule of law critiques of the criminal justice
system, notably works by Allen and historian Samuel Walker.43 Indeed, by
the end of last century, as is evident in the famous case of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,' an essentially rule of law-based critique of the irrationality of
criminal justice was already within the grasp of the United States Supreme
Court.45
Yet there is also little doubt that great, often illiberal social pressures
continuously impact the content and structure of the criminal justice system
and that these forces tendto undermine rule of law's rationalizing influence
in the criminal context or to prevent such influence altogether. In the
criminal justice context, reason prevails but rarely and hesitantly, and
virtually never in any spontaneous way. Criminal justice is perhaps
necessarily the most remote beneficiary of the broader liberalizing thrust
of capitalism and modernity. The criminal justice system is traditionally the
dispensary of contradictions arising from the failure of capitalism and
modernity to rationalize society even by their own standards (as is evident
with lingering poverty, race, and gender discrimination), and it serves to
control conflicts which are arguably intrinsic to modem society (e.g., class
conflict and social alienation generally).46
A. The (Normal) Irrationality of Crime and Criminal Justice
It is fair to say that criminal justice is inherently irrational, illiberal, and
always open to the reformist guidance of rule of law. The nature of the
subject implies as much. So far as reason in the classical western tradition
contemplates a democratic identity of interests (i.e., the harmonious
convergence of "subject and object"), and putting aside any arguments as
to the vulgar rationality of crime (e.g., that criminals plan or profit
43 See generally ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 6; WALKER,
supra note 42.
" Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (recognizing unconstitutionality
of de facto discriminatory laws).
45 See id. at 366-69 (featuring a spirited argument, from rule of law principles,
against arbitrary authority "without reason and without responsibility," as well as
sovereign action which "acknowledges neither guidance nor restraint," and that
"equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws").
I For a pioneering study of this claim, see GEORG RUCHE & OTrO
KIRScOHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939). See also FRANCIS
SNYDER&DOUGLAS HAY, LABOUR, LAWAND CRIME: AHISTORICALPERSPECTIVE
(1988); SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND
CRISIS IN AMERICA (1995).
[VOL. 87
VICTIMS' RIGHTS
financially from their actions), the criminal act, including all its causes, is
by definition the antithesis of reason.47 This irrationality manifests itself
within the criminal justice process as a variety of indelible, often patently
violent conflicts: the state versus the criminal, the criminal versus the state,
and the criminal versus the victim. Equally peculiar about criminal justice
in this regard is that its irrationality is relatively transparent and is not at all
well-restrained or cloaked by the type of consensual, conflict-suppressing
ideology common to economic or even political intercourse.4 8 Rather, the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system tends to be maintained by an
appeal to archaic, irrational ideological assumptions.
Another reason for the relative importance of rule of law to the
rationalization of criminal justice concerns the tripartite structure of the
institution of crime. More consistently than any other area of law, modern
criminal justice counterposes the interests of three discrete subjects: the
defendant/criminal, the victim, and the state. It goes beyond the binary
relationship of defendant and plaintiff, which is more typical of modern
legal transactions. This characteristic of criminal justice compounds its
inherent irrationality in several ways: first, by multiplying the number of
conflicts intrinsic to the criminal context; second, by maintaining a
connection to the subjectivity ofvictimhood, hence to the victim's passions
" I speak here about reason in the substantive, critical sense identifiable with
Hegel and best articulated in Hegelian Marxism. SeegenerallyLUKACS,supra note
17; HERBERT MARCUSE, REASON AND REVOLUTION (1991). Inasmuch as these
figures, like Hegel, demonstrate that the aspiration to reason has an inherently
substantive, critical component, this notion of reason is actually universal. This
means, of course, that crime is irrational in the social, and not biological or
otherwise purely subjective, sense. Further, I distinguish my arguments here from
those of James Q. Wilson to the effect that crime is actually "rational" in a purely
self-interested sense. Cf JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKINGABOUT CRIME (1985); Gary
S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). I regard the notion of rationality as philosophically inconsistent; reason
does not comport with social conflict. According to Allen, "[tihe legality ideal
confronts its sternest test in the area of criminal justice" because, he argues, public
passions and the power of the state converge on this point. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF
LEGALITY, supra note 6, at 5-6.
" On typical modes of suppressing social conflict, see JURGEN HABERMAS,
LEGITIMATION CRISIS (1973). See also BARRY HINDESS & PAUL Q. HIRST, PRE-
CAPITALIST MODES OF PRODUCTION 44-45, 69-70 (1975); cf. PERRY ANDERSON,
PASSAGES FROM ANTIQUITY TO FEUDALISM 147-53 (1974) (discussing conflict
suppressing ideology common to feudal economies); OLIVER C. COX, CASTE,
CLASS AND RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS (1948).
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and vengeance; and third, by introducing into a relationship which is still
somewhat private the authority of the state. It is because of this tripartite
structure that criminal justice resists both a clear categorization as either
public or private law-a determination that is generally a centerpiece ofrule
of law-and the thorough purger of archaic practices and expectations.49
B. The Rationalizing Functions ofRule ofLaw in the Criminal
Context
Viewed alongside other failings of capitalism to produce on its
promises to rationalize the world even by its own terms," it is not at all
surprising that while rule of law has gained rational compromises in the
criminal context, it has been relatively powerless to resolve once and for
all the fundamental irrationality of crime or to quench the causes of crime
consistent with its own normative agenda (e.g., without descending to
authoritarianism or totalitarianism or both). The archaic tendencies and
irrational nature of crime, together with its extralegal origins, are impossi-
ble to completely defeat. Nevertheless, rule of law's facility to mandate
meaningful compromise has proven quite significant.
Rule of law exerts a basic rationalizing influence with its insistence
that crime be defined by law and law be construed as general norms. This
mandate immediately implies a state monopoly of criminal justice and
suggests that a private criminal regime is incapable of making or adminis-
tering truly general law. This mandate also illustrates the limitation of
criminal law to public law. By repressing the infusion of private rights, rule
of law avoids the fusion of political and civil, as well as public and private
rights which overlay the ancient spectacle of religiously/morally inspired
criminal justice and the blood feud.5" Consequently-and this becomes most
49 See KERMrrL. HALL, THEMAGIC MIRROR: LAWINAMERICANHISTORY 168-
88, 300-03 (1989).50 Of course certain irrational impulses are endemic to the history of capitalism
and modernity. Although contradictory of its broadly egalitarian, normative
agenda, fascism, statism, racism, sexism, and material inequality are obviously not
actually inconsistent with capitalism. Indeed, they are vices perpetuated at many
turns by the structural logic of capitalism. On the theoretical dimensions of this
argument, a central theme of Frankfurt School Marxism, Marxist theories of race
and imperialism, and Marxist feminism, see especially MAX HORKHEIMER &
THEODOR ADORNO, THE DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1972), a text that flirts
with the outright repudiation of modernity as such.
51 See, e.g., STEPHEN SCHAFER, THE VICTIM AND HIS CRIMINAL 27-29 (1968)
(describing, ambivalently, the decline of the victim and the concomitant rise of
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important for present concerns-rule of law inherently represses the role of
the victim, a would-be proponent of private right. Moreover, the formal,
secular spirit of rule of law opposes any basis of criminal law on religious,
ad hoe morality, or other grounds irreducible to general norms. Similarly,
with its tendency to mandate a self-standing, closed, and definitive system,
rule of law prohibits arbitrary, retroactive, unbounded, and extralegal
punishment and implies a system of criminal justice based on separation of
powers. In addition, the familiar dual rule of law principles nulla poena
sine lege and nullum crimen sine lege prevail: no punishment without law
and no crime without law.52 The structure of general law automatically
prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws and enforces separation
of powers. Thus, according to rule of law, criminal law must be created by
the legislature but administered by the executive and judiciary in accor-
dance with strict rules isolating their respective functions. Further still, the
impact ofrule oflaw's substantive norms is evident with a general pressure
not only for formal equality but also for mitigation of the inegalitarianism
of criminal justice and deference to general principles of liberty and
reason.
53
The specific content and structure of American criminal law andpolicy
actually reflect a number of concessions to these erstwhile progressive
modem criminal justice in terms of the development "of the contractual
Gesellschaftsystem [T6nnies], characterized by social interaction that is voluntary,
secular, secondary, rationalistic, impersonal").
52 See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 212 n.12 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (describing nullum crimen sine lege as a principle of law).53 As I describe above, rule of law mandates more general substantive norms:
reason, justice, and freedom. Applied to criminal justice, these norms yield rules
closely akin to Cesare Beccaria's classic critique of pre-enlightenment criminal
justice: the prohibition of torture, indefinite confinement, double jeopardy, and
status crime. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Richard
Bellamy ed. & Richard Davies trans., 1995) (1764). Modem authors share
Beccaria's critique. See generally Wilfried Bottke, "Rule ofLaw" or Due Process
as a Common Feature of Criminal Process in Western Democratic Societies, 51 U.
PITT. L. REV. 419 (1990); William M. Cohen, Principles for Establishment of a
Rule of Law Criminal Justice System, 23 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 269 (1993);
WALKER, supra note 42, at 127-29.
All of these practices are inconsistent as Beccaria argued, with the spirit of
enlightenment and liberalism. See BECCARIA, supra. To paraphrase Foucault, the
economy of punishment and authority has serious difficulty trading in the likes of
torture and arbitrary punishment because they cannot be reduced to its logic;
therefore, it does not. See FOUCAULT, supra note 42, at 16-31.
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impulses. Most prominently, for present purposes at least, is the gradual
displacement of the victim's standing in the criminal justice context. Such
displacement is, as I have already suggested, quite necessary to a rule of
law regime. Stated another way, the contemporary legal definition of crime
focuses on its origins from within the public law: a crime is a wrong
affecting the public to which the state has attached certain punishments and
penalties and which it prosecutes in its own name.4 As a consequence, a
citizen may file a criminal complaint but is not entitled to initiate a private
prosecution (at least with respect to a felony) or control its course by right
(yet); to allow either violates a defendant's due process rights."5 Likewise,
any private cause of action by a victim against an offender is relegated to
the civil tort law. Tort and criminal law are thereby firmly segregated into
separate proceedings.
Various doctrines converge to realize the ideal of a closed, rule-based
system of criminal justice implied by rule of law. These rules include the
manichean, role-separating functions of separation of powers, including
judicial independence and the prohibition of judicial or executive legisla-
tion of the criminal law as well as the prohibition of legislative execution
and interpretation (i.e., no vague or ambiguous law). Also working to close
offthe boundaries of criminal justice are the sanctification of formality and
process and the prohibition of retroactive, ex post facto crimes and bills of
attainder;56 the triumph of the legal conception of criminal culpability over
factual or subjective notions;5  and the requirements of certainty and lenity
and the prohibition of vague and ambiguous prohibitions." Also in this
14 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw §§ 1, 5 (1981); see also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 370-72 (6th ed. 1990).
55 Private prosecutions violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); see also People v. Benoit, 575
N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 (Crim. Ct. 1991); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005,
1009 (Crim. Ct. 1991). On the generally unconstitutional nature of private
prosecutions, see John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality
ofPrivate Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511 (1994).
56 On the significance of separation of powers in the criminal context, see, for
example, United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1389-94 (6th Cir. 1996), opinion
vacatedby 114 F.3d 84 (6th Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 441-46 (1965) (recognizing that the bill of attainder clause effectuates the
"framers' belief' in separation ofpowers and the limits of each branch's respective
competency); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866).
17 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw §§ 1-13 (1981).
58 On the requirementthat criminal laws be reasonably certain, see, for example,
Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952), and Jordan v. De
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category are constitutional guarantees of notice and certainty,59 as well as
the rule that a crime is comprised of a set of essential elements-typically
intent (mens rea) and act (actus reus)-elements, under the due process
clause, the state must prove beyond reasonable doubt.6°
Related to these, in turn, is another set of rules which evidence, in more
general terms, the concession of criminal justice to substantive rule of law
norms. Most notably, due process in the criminal context is construed to
require "fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."6'
Equal protection implies that "no state can deprive particular persons or
classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law."62 Further-
more, the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
creates substantive injunctions against archaic, torturous punishments.63
Finally, in theory, only a legal conviction in accord with such requirements
and with effective rights of appeal justifies punitive incarceration.' Indeed,
George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). On vagueness, see, for example, Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566 (1974), Papachristou v. City ofJacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972),
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645 (2d
Cir. 1992), and United States v. Doremus, 888 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1989). On lenity,
see, for example, United States v. Bice-Bey, 701 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 837 (1983), and State v. Piazza, 596 So. 2d 817 (La. 1992).
59 Courts have determined that notice is an implicit aim of ex post facto and bill
of attainder provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 88 F.3d 225, 228 (3d Cir.
1996); United States v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1995); Dufresne v. Baer,
744 F.2d 1543, 1546 (llth Cir. 1984).
6 See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,205-06 (1977); People v. Pegenau,
523 N.W.2d 325, 333 (Mich. 1994). On the necessity of satisfying the requisite
elements of a crime for purposes of indictment, see, for example, United States v.
Martinez, 981 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1992). See also Matter of Hews, 741 P.2d 983,
989 (Wash. 1987) (holding that a defendant must understand the elements of a
crime to enter a valid guilty plea).
61 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
62Ughbanks v. Arnston, 208 U.S. 481,487 (1907).
63See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976); Alston v. DeBruyn,
13 F.3d 1036 (1994) (involving indefinite confinement).
' On the limitation of punishment to criminal convictions, see, for example,
Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1981), Reece v. Gragg, 650 F.Supp.
1297 (D. Kan. 1986), Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Iowa 1974), and
State v. Thomas, 550 So. 2d 1067 (Ala. 1989).
It is also worth noting that, where still applicable, fines have largely been
formalized and, to a large degree, are not strictly fungible with conventional
criminal sanctions. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that astate may
not automatically convert a fine to jail term solely because of a defendant's
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we may say more generally still that with some notable exceptions (e.g.,
capital punishment),65 what Foucault envisioned as a rearticulation of the
economy of punishment has come to typify the modem system of criminal
justice: quantifiable, temporal confinement (the prison) has largely
replaced corporeal punishment, status crimes, preventative detention,
enslavement, civil death, and so forth.6 In this sense, and precisely as
Neumann anticipated, the formal structure of rule of law has affected
certain substantive norms.
Generality, then, can be seen to underlie the basic doctrines of
American criminal law andprocedure. This centrality is emphasizedbythat
norm's implicit but repeated reference in major Supreme Court cases that
comprise the Warren Court's (and early Burger Court's) progressive
reformation of criminal justice. By this I mean that the most significant
cases in such jurisprudence center around not only norms broadly
identifiable with rule of law (e.g., due process), but also two themes
directly implied by generality: equality and, broadly speaking, procedural
uniformity.67
indigence); 21 AM. JUR. 2D CriminalLaw §§ 617, 618 (1981). The general rule is
that incarceration may be warranted to punish as contempt the failure to pay a fine,
not as an alternative to payment as such. See Tate, 401 U.S. at 400-01.
65 Even in the context of capital punishment, a certain archaic economy
prevails: death for death-but not for rape, theft, etc. See generally Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
"SeeFOUCAULT, supra note 42, at 7; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,
522-24, on remand, 744 F.2d 22 (1984) (limits of civil death); Papachristou v. City
of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 (1972) (status crimes); Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, rehearing denied, 366 U.S. 978 (1961) (status crimes); Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,285-86 (1936) (excessive corporeal contact); Madewell
v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1207 (8th Cir. 1990) (limits of forced labor); Thompson
v. Bond, 421 F. Supp. 878, 884-85 (W.D. Miss. 1976) (limits of civil death). For
a comprehensive description, if topically narrow, critique of such shame
punishments, see James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame
Sanctions?, 107 YALE L. J. 1055 (1998).
67 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), for example, employed the
principle of equality behind its mandate that states provide counsel to indigents. See
id. at 344. Equality surfaced repeatedly in the opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), which temporarily suspended the application of the death penalty
on the grounds that the institutions by which it was applied yielded discriminatory
results. See id. at 242. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), used the same norm
to justify the extension of substantial rights of appeal to indigents. See id. at 17.
Indeed, for these Courts, the constitutional doctrine of equal protection translated
into a slew of rulings that tend to rationalize the criminal justice process. For
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instance, in Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, on remand, 109 N.W.2d 703 (Iowa
1961), barring the deprivation ofindigents' rights to collateral federal appeals with
nonwaiveable filing fees, the Warren Court (per Justice Clark) declared that the
"Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal
scale, and its hand extends as far to each." Id. at 714; see also Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1963) (holding that equal protection requires
provision of counsel to the indigent for one appeal of right). Also, in Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), where the Court prohibited the use of imprisonment
as punishment for the inability to pay a criminal fine, Chief Justice Berger wrote
that the "Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the
statutory ceiling placed on imprisonment for any substantive offense be the same
for all defendants irrespective of their economic status." Id. at 244; see also Tate
v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). Both the Warren and Burger Courts averred to equal
protection to invalidate unequal procedures for the civil commitment of criminal
defendants (i.e., the use of civil commitment to accomplish a punitive, criminal
function). See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1972); Baxtrom v.
Harold, 383 U.S. 107, 115 (1966).
Generality also resonates as the requirement of specificity in the decision. This
notion is illustratedbyPapachristou's impeachment of status crimes (vagrancy and
"common thief'), arbitrariness, and vagueness. SeePapachristou, 405 U.S. at 156;
see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Even more evident is the use
of generality as the principle of uniformity. InMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1963),
the quest for uniformity was translated as the exclusionary rule, whereby
(ostensibly) all the fruit of the tainted tree is (theoretically) per se excludable. See
id. at 657-58. The Court applied the same normative logic to Miranda and
Escobedo, yielding their exclusionary (and also equalizing) thrust. See id. at 643;
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). This idea resurfaced in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), where
uniformity underlies the extension of Fifth Amendment protections to defendants
in state proceedings. See id. at 5-6.
In each of these cases, the invalidated rule contradicted generality and the broad
holding gave the norm greater effect. Indeed, one overall thrust of the Warren
Court was to make generally and equally applicable-to nationalize and strip of
racial, class, and gender biases-already existing principles of law. In the words of
Allen:
The history of the Warren Court may be taken as a case study of a court that
for a season determined to employ its judicial resources in an effort to alter
significantly the nature of American criminal justice in the interest of a
larger realization of the constitutional ideal of liberty under the law.
Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, in CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 29,36 (Victor J. Stone ed.,
1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal Justice];
see also PAULKURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT
1998-99]
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As a whole, rule of law plainly asserts certain progressive mandates on
the structure and content of the criminal justice system. At the same time,
neither legal doctrine nor the law itself can effectively and completely
impose reason upon the structure and content of the entire criminal justice
system-which, after all, is not mainly legal in its functional origins. This
tenuous state of affairs is not lost upon Walker and Hall, who recognize
that the positive impact of rule of law on criminal justice is rather
fortuitous and that its history is replete with anti-rule of law tendencies,
which were only recently, incompletely, and very tenuously brought to
bay.68
C. Compromise, Lingering Irrationality, and the Inherent Weakness
ofDialectic
The criminal justice system reveals a failure to concede entirely to the
rule of law. Instead, one finds that rule oflaw's progressive functions make
74-83, 162 (1970).
68 Walker, for instance, writes:
A major theme in the history of American criminal justice is the tension
between the rule of law and the passions of popular justice. The idea of rule
of law implies fairness, equality, and consistency. But the history of the
administration of justice is largely the story of arbitrary and capricious
justice, often carried out in the name of community prejudice. The struggle
for justice involves reconciling democratic principles, and all their pitfalls,
with standards of fairness and equality.
WALKER, supra note 42, at 4. Similarly, the legal historian Kermit Hall observes
an apparently persistent tendency in this country not to embrace too closely
Beccaria's enlightenment/liberal rationalism (i.e., his classical, rational
criminology). See HALL, supra note 49, at 170-71.
For Georg Rusche and Otto Kirschheimer, this tendency toward a certain
cautious rationalization of the criminal justice system was swept along by the
broader current of liberalism's defeat of the old absolutist order. For them, these
rationalizing tendencies in the criminal justice context are therefore contingent on
a fortuitous convergence of such policies with liberalism's economic and political
agenda.
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the bond between the
protection of the material foundations of bourgeois society and an apparent
equality and humaneness in the administration of criminal justice for all
classes of society was never openly attacked. Everywhere the political
opposition to absolutism condemned a criminal justice which did not seem
to be governed by fixed rules, even where no definite objections were raised
against its contents, such as the use of imprisonment.
RUCHE & KIRSCHHEIMER, supra note 46, at 73.
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persistent concessions to the inherent irrationality of criminal justice.
Simultaneously, the more insurgent implications of rule of law in the
criminal context are restrained by its dialectical structure as evidenced by
the infrequency of rule of law critiques of criminal justice. As the distinct
limitations of Warren Court's jurisprudence suggest, rule of law never
really demanded that much in the way of reforms.6 9 Inevitably, the impact
of rule of law on the criminal justice system has been modestly reformist
and, notwithstanding reactionary rhetoric, generally tolerant of a system
still irrational at its core and therefore relatively unaccommodating of the
interests of criminals and criminal defendants.
The reality of the situation is obvious to any objective observer of
contemporary developments in criminal justice. A recent book by Elliot
Currie reiterates the argument that the nature of criminal justice in this
country is shaped far more bypolitics-and often very dubious politics-than
by any principles of reason or legality.7" Indeed, Allen reveals that rule of
law has never successfully mandated a criminal justice system that is
rational in the sense that it is even nonfragmentary or free of tremendous
police andprosecutorial discretion.7 ' Withoutbroachingthis subject, which
cannot be discussed here, it is clear that even the height of the defendants'
and convicts' rights movements (generally, the mid-1960s through the
early 1980s) did not correct or even fundamentally alter the nature of the
system. For example, conviction and incarceration rates remained
consistently high;n gross racial and class biases persisted in rates of
69 See Allen, The Judicial Questfor Penal Justice, supra note 67.
70 See ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 6-8 (1998).
At least one recent study appears to bear out Kirschheimer and Rusche's
observation that the content of criminal justice (e.g., the severity of punishment)
has nothing directly to do with the management of crime. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING
& GORDONHAWKINS, PRISONPOPULATION AND CRIMINALJUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA
(1992); see also RUCHE & KIRSCHHEIMER, supra note 46.
71 See ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 6, at 58-72.
72 A review of recent data and trends in incarceration rates quickly dispels any
doubt about the state's "failure to respond" to crime. As of 1995, 5.4 million
Americans-2.8 percent of the total population-were under correctional supervision,
representing an increase of 2.4 million since 1985. .See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONALPOPULATIONS NTHEUNITED STATES, 1995, at 5-6 (1997). Indeed,
ninepercent ofnAmerican males (28% of black males!) may expect to go to prison
at least once within their lifetimes. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LIFETIME
LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON (1997).
On conviction rates, see, for example, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1994, at 24-27 (1998). On the relative
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victimization, prosecution, and enforcement; 73 such plainly archaic
punishments as banishment, forced labor, and certain incidents of civil
death (e.g., disenfranchisement) were never really repudiated;74 and the
overall conditions of confinement, although much improved over earlier
horrors, never yielded the widespread availability of comfortable condi-
tions conducive to rehabilitation or even non-recriminalization (except to
the extent that offenders came from even more horrible environments on
the outside), much less the mythical "country clubs" of the public
imagination.75
stability of both overall and violent crime rates over the past two decades, see, for
example, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME VICTIMIZATION, 1973-95 (1997).
In their classic study of the origins of criminal policy, Georg Ruche and Otto
Kirschheimer long ago (1939) concluded that the rate of criminality has little to do
with the severity and extent of criminal sanction. See RUCHE & KIRSCHHEIMER,
supra note 46.
1 The limits of equal protection in the criminal justice context have been
explored in many distinct contexts. See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243
(1970) (holding that equal protection does not require like treatment for like
offenses); United States v. Bassford, 812 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v.
Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1980); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279, 292-97, reh'g denied, 482 U.S. 920 (1987) (deeming statistical evidence of
race bias intrinsically inadequate as the basis for an equal protection claim vis-h-vis
the application of criminal sentences).
On pervasive class biases in prosecution and incarceration, see, for example,
JEFFREY REIMAN, AND THE POOR GET PRISON: ECONOMIC BIAS IN AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1996).
' See, e.g., Cobb v. State, 437 So. 2d 1218 (Miss. 1983) (evaluating the
constitutionality of banishment). The Thirteenth Amendment specifically permits
the enslavement of duly convicted persons. See Jobsonv. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d.
Cir. 1966); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963). There is no right,
constitutional or contractual, to pay for prison labor. See, e.g., Murray v.
Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167 (5th Cir. 1990); Wendt v.
Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988). Notably, it is well established that
convicted persons may lose voting rights, which some might regard as too
fundamental to lose at all. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-56, on
remand, 528 P.2d 378 (1974).
75 See JACK HENRY ABBOT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM
PRISON (1982); PETER EARLY, THE HOT HOUSE: LIFE INSIDE LEAVENWORTH
PRISON (1993); WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: SURVIVAL
BEHIND BARS (1992). Or, for those who require less anecdotal information, see
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH REPORT (199 1). See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
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Indeed, while we should not in any way discount the value of rule of
law-oriented reforms, Foucault and others argue that, far from creating a
criminal's or convict's paradise, "civilized," "enlightened" reforms play a
role in legitimating and perpetuating the institution of crime as such and
thereby legitimating its irrational social causes.76 Suffice it to say the
system which rule of law supports is not, then, a radical system. Neither is
the system altogether reactionary. Rather, it is a set of compromises
squarely within the liberal tradition and yet grounded on rule of law's
rather tenuous foundation.
IV. VICTIMS' RIGHTS, NAZI AND
(CARL) SCHMITTIAN THEMES, AND RULE OF LAW
Just as rule of law's rationalizing functions are nowhere more
necessary than in the criminal justice context, the contemporary devastation
of rule of law is nowhere more severe than in the criminal justice context77
and the field of victims' rights in particular. In a wide variety of ways, the
victims' rights agenda disregards, contradicts, and finally tends to destroy
the efficacy of the construct as an organ ofprogressivejurisprudence. Such
corrosiveness is magnified by a habit of confronting rule of law under the
guise of exposing its immanent shortcomings. Victims' rights masks its
antipathy to rule of law by styling itself as the perfection of rule of law's
various norms. All along this path, victims' rights, lacking any jurispruden-
tial mandate of its own, duplicates key elements of the theories of Schmitt
and Nazi jurisprudence generally.78
(involving privacy and property rights of incarcerated persons).
76 See FOUCAULT, supra note 42; Drew Humphries & David Greenburg, The
Dialectics of Crime Control, in CRIME AND CAPITALISM 209-54 (1993); Philip
Jenkins, Varieties ofEnlightenment Criminology, 24 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 112
(1984).
' Although space prohibits going into the details of the relationship between
rule of law and recent developments in the criminal justice system generally, other
studies speak well enough to the jurisprudential questionableness of these changes.
See, e.g., ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 6; STEVEN R. DONZIGER
ET AL., THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL
JUSTICE COMMISSION BY THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMMISSION (1996).
" Allen paints a picture ofcriminaljustice devoid of rule of law that, he argues,
might resemble not only Nazi justice, but also South African and (predominantly
Stalinist era?) Soviet systems: "In all the most oppressive regimes of the present
century, legality values, particularly in the areas of ordinary and political crimes,
were not simply ignored but were, in fact, deliberately and systematically
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What is victims' rights? To be sure, the victims' rights movement is
quite nebulous and its ideas are scattered about without any outstanding
congruity. 9 Indeed, any effort to define victims' rights as a contiguous idea
runs squarely into the problem of distinguishing victims' rights from a
broader, uniformly reactionary movement to transform the criminal justice
system. Equally significant, the movement is entirely lacking any well-
developed theory or jurisprudence from which its essential meaning could
be gleaned8°-other than the hidden identity with Schmitt and Nazism that
I propose.
In the absence of a clear definition, we must categorize the movement
in order to identify a basic victims' rights agenda. This can be done by
focusing on certain initiatives which, although they may not be entirely
uniform, are nonetheless predominant and expressed with already enacted
state and federal statutes, state constitutional provisions, a pending federal
constitutional amendment, and a variety of other popular and scholarly
ideas. From these common initiatives, a workable definition of the
movement can be obtained. To the extent that this body has a primary
theme, it is clearly a campaign to generally enhance the role of crime
destroyed." ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 6, at 97. 1 do not quarrel
with this observation, but instead focus on the convergence withNazijurisprudence
because their practice and theory were both extraordinarily well-developed.79See, e.g., FRANK J. WEED, CERTAINTY OF JUSTICE: REFORM IN THE CRIMINAL
VICTIMS MOVEMENT 143 (1995) ("The reform concept of victims' rights lacks a
clear substance, a specific target, and a working program.").
1o My review of the scholarly literature on victims' rights reveals a wholesale
lack of sophistication among arguments in defense of victims' rights. Aside from
the Schmittian and Nazi themes that I explore in depth, the main themes of such
defenses appear to be limited to the following: a generalized theory of moral desert
and retribution; an appeal to the past; a thin pluralism, counter-posing claims of
victims versus "criminals"; and repeated appeals to common sense or the supposed,
self-evident righteousness of victims' rights. The retributive notion appears to be
predominant, if not grounded in modem jurisprudential ideals. See Leslie Sebba,
The Victim's Role in the Penal Process: A Theoretical Orientation, in TOWARD A
CRITICAL VICTIMOLOGY 195 (Ezzat A. Fattah ed., 1992) [hereinafter Sebba, The
Victim's Role in the Penal Process].
Other justifications tend to be more vague. For law professor and victims'
rights advocate Paul Cassell, the restoration of private criminal justice again
contemplates a search for lost balance. See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales
ofJustice: The Casefor and the Effects of Utah 's Victims 'Rights Amendment, 1994
UTAH L.J. 1373, 1375-76 (1994) (appealing to balance). See generally Richard L.
Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government Responsibility and the Right
Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 63, 115-16 (1984) (presenting victims'
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victims within the criminal justice system."1 The various practical
dimensions of this campaign maybe characterized in terms of demands for
the following: (1) restitution, participation, and control of the criminal
justice process; (2) protection; (3) vengeance; and (4) general political
demands against the interests of defendants and offenders. 2
rights as, essentially, a positive right to protection); Frank Carrington & George
Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 11
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 1, 4 (1984) (providing no particular reason for victims' rights
except that they have "been forgotten"); Ken Eikenberry, Victims of Crime/Victims
ofJustice, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 29 (1984) (presenting an argument from emotions
and history); Josephine Gittler, ExpandingtheRole of Victim in a CriminalAction:
An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1984)
(defending victims' rights as warranted by general considerations of fairness and
history); Paul S. Hudson, The Crime Victim and the CriminalJustice System: Time
for a Change, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 23, 24-26 (framing victims' rights as a
corrective to the "modem ideology of criminal justice," an argument from history);
Deborah P. Kelly, Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 69, 69-70 (1984) (stating that
victims' rights is necessary, inter alia, to alleviate the "dehumanizing" effect of
criminal justice system on victims); Dean G. Kilpatrick & Randy K. Otto,
Constitutionally Guaranteed Participation in Criminal Proceedings for Victims:
Potential Effects on Psychological Functioning, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 7, 7-9 (1984)
(defending victims' rights on the theory that it has therapeutic effects for victims);
William F. McDonald, Toward a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice, 13
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 649-51 (1976) (presenting an argument from history); Karyn
Ellen Polito, Note, The Rights of Victims in the Criminal Justice System, 16 NEw
ENG. J. CRIM. & CIrv. CONFINEMENT 241, 242 (1990) (appealing to "fair and
equitable treatment"). Elsewhere, as we shall see, victims rights are justified on the
basis of generalized claims for "justice."
Several scholars have cut against the grain to criticize victims' rights. Notable
pieces include Whitman, supra note 66, and Lynn Henderson, The Wrongs of
Victims 'Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1984).
s As I shall explain in the conclusion of this Article, it is not at all necessary
that victims' rights operate within the criminal justice system as such. This point
is recognized in the scholarship, though not typically embraced. See, e.g., LESLIE
SEBBA, THIRD PARTY VICTIMS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996)
[hereinafter SEBBA, THIRD PARTY VICTIMS].
82 See, e.g., NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, THE 1996 VICTIMS' RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK: A COMPILATION AND COMPARISON OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS LAWS
(1996) [hereinafter VICTIMS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK]. For an overview of the
victims' rights movement, see Bruce Shapiro, Victims and Vengeance: Why the
Victims'Rights Amendment Is a Bad Idea, NATION, Feb. 10, 1997, at 11. For an
overview of the history of victims rights, see OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Crime Victims 'Rights in America: An Historical Overview, in
1998-99]
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An analysis of the specifics of this agenda reveals its recurrent
consistency with Schmittian and Nazi ideas concentrated around a
comprehensive antithesis to rule of law. The many facets of this common
attitude toward rule of law may be discussed within several broad,
overlapping themes: (1) the attitude toward liberalism, formal, general
rules, and the courts; (2) the concepts of guilt and criminality and the
boundaries of criminal justice; (3) the view on private and community
justice in the criminal context; (4) the perspective on vengeance and the
nature of punishment; and (5) the perversion of rule of law's substantive
norms.
A. The Rejection ofLiberalism and Legal Generality and the Attack
on the Courts
Schmitt's notorious demolition of rule of law is premised in one sense
on a straightforward rejection of liberalism and general legal norms. For
Schmitt, liberalism and enlightenment embody a political and ideological
system whose inherent function is to distort and obscure manifest and
immutable social conflicts beneath what he regards as an unfounded
optimism about the prospects for achieving a rational social order.83 In
Schmitt's view, the essential mode of social being is the political, an
irrational realm composed of "the most intense and extreme antagonism"
and characterized by "friend and enemy" relationships.84 Neumann
characterizes this construct in the following way: "This is a doctrine of
brute force in its most striking form, one that sets itself against every aspect
and act of liberal democracy and against our whole traditional conception
of the governance of law."85 In Schmitt's view, this relationship is not only
central, it trumps rule of law. For the enemy is
the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a
specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that
in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible. These can neither be
1998 National Crime Victims' Rights Week: April 19-25 (1998). For a
comprehensive, although dated outline of existing victims' rights, seeJAMES STARK
& HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS: AN AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK (1985). For another layperson's guide, see DEBRA
J. WILSON, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS (1995).83 See SCHMIT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 3, at 69-79.
84 Id. at 26 ("The specific political distinction to which political actions and
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.").
15 NEumANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 45.
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decided by apreviously determined general norm nor by the judgment of
a disinterested and therefore neutral thirdparty8
6
Inasmuch as rule of law is rational, its ethical content fundamentally
consensual and liberal, its normative structure built around generality, and
its function anti-political, rule of law legalizes and otherwise legitimates
this blindness to the nature of social being, paralyzing and frustrating those
forces which appreciate the true political nature of things.8 7 Notably,
Schmitt eagerly applied his normless theory directly to the purpose of
criminal law: "Today everyone will recognize that the maxim 'No crime
without punishment' takes priority over the maxim 'No punishment
without law' as the higher and stronger legal truth."8
As with its foremost jurist, the overall Nazi attitude toward rule of law
is also characterized by a deep hostility toward liberalism and general legal
norms. Aside from being recognized as a repository of Enlightenment
values that impedes Nazism's irrational, opportunistic, and arbitrary
designs, rule of law norms are also seen as particular expressions of an
inability to appreciate the Nazi maxim that political power and conflict are
central to social being. As Hitler informs us, "There is only one kind of law
in the world, and that lies in one's own strength."8 9 In the words of one
Nazi jurist, "'Almost all the principles, concepts, and distinctions of our
law up to now are stamped with the Spirit of Enlightenment, and they
therefore require reshaping on the basis of a new kind of thought and
experience."'" In general, it is quite clear that for Nazi jurisprudence, just
as for Schmitt, the hostility toward liberalism is articulated as a systematic
repudiation of rule of law norms in favor of an alternative jurisprudence of
highly politicized, nonuniform, archaic, and ultimately ad hoc characteris-
tics intellectualized in Schmitt's theory of legal decisionism.91
86 SCHMIT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 3, at 27 (emphasis
added).87 See id.; see also SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3, at 15-24.
88 INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 75
(1991) (quoting Schmitt).
89 2 NAZISM: A DOCUMENTARY READER: STATE, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY
(1984) [hereinafter NAZISM: A DOCUMENTARY READER] (quoting Adolf Hitler).
See generally ADOLF HITLER, MEN KAMPF (1939) (including extensive, mostly
rambling vitriolic denunciations of liberalism, constitutionalism, intellectualism,
and the like).
'MOLLER, supra note 88, at 70-71 (quoting Professor Friedreich Schaffstein).
91 See, e.g., MICHAEL BURLEIGH & WOLFGANG WIPPERMANN, THE RACIAL
STATE: GERMANY, 1933-1945, at 172-82 (1991); OTIS C. MITCHELL, HITLER'S
NAZI STATE: THE YEARS OF DICTATORIAL RULE (1934-45), at 212 (1988);
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The Nazis recognized the independent judiciary as a primary institu-
tional foundation of rule of law. Therefore, with the intellectual support of
Schmitt and other theorists, they proceeded fervently, in a disorganized
way, to undermine the independence of the courts from the political arm of
the state and, in general, to guarantee that the courts served the will of the
state and not the law.92
The similarity of victims' rights to Nazi jurisprudence begins with a
virtually identical antipathy to liberalism and generality and extends to a
hostile attitude toward judicial independence. Thus, on one level, the
overall anti-liberal tendencies of victims' rights are direct and transparent.
This is evidenced by a fairly consistent affiliation with the conservative
agendas of police, prosecutors, and jailors, with an embrace of the politics
of "law and order" and the "war on crime," generally, and the underlying
notion that crime is of emergency proportions and requires extensive
emergency remedies. Indeed, at least one analyst of the movement regards
victims' rights as the unfortunate slave of conservative right-wing
politics. 93
On another level, such sentiments are implied by deep hostility of
victims' rights to the sanctity of the legal process and constitutional rule
and by the frequency with which its supporters make historical appeals to
the age of private prosecutions and "effective" justice and to the supposed
security of the days before the Warren Court reforms.94 This attitude
extends to a critique of both the independence of the legal process and the
independence of courts in particular. With disturbing frequency, and often
little regard for the facts or jurisprudence in question, victims' rights
disdain for judicial independence and "liberal" judges has manifest itself
in concerted campaigns to remove unacceptable judges from office.95 This
MOLLER, supra note 88, at 68-8 1; NEUMANN,RULE OFLAW, supra note 17, at286-
98.
92 See generally RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, NAzI JUSTIZ: LAW OF THE
HOLOCAUST (1995); MOLLER, supra note 88; see also NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH,
supra note 4, at 630-32.
93 See ROBERT ELIAS, VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF
CRIMINAL VICTIMS (1993).
' See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note 80; Gittler, supra note 80; Hudson, supra
note 80; McDonald, supra note 80.
' Such activities by victims' rights groups are focused on the issue of the death
penalty and have resulted in the outright transformation of a number of states'
judiciaries. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can
Justice Be Done Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for
Unpopular Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308 (1997); Gerald F. Uelmen,
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activity reached outlandish proportions with Congress's intervention, on
behalf of victims, in the Oklahoma City bombing trial.96
B. The Concepts of Guilt and Criminality and the Boundaries of
Criminal Justice
Schmitt argues that the friend/enemy relationship "can neither be
decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment of
a disinterested and therefore neutral third party."'97 As such, the essence of
proper legal intercourse for him can only be political and not legal. For
Schmitt and his fellow Nazis, such an attitude justified the politization of
criminal law, its concepts and its functions. This was achieved in two steps:
first, identifying the enemy by criminalizing racial, ethnic, and biological
categories; and second, by dispensing with both the formality and the
normative substance of rule of law in order to deal with such people.9 In
the criminal justice context specifically, according to Mtiller, such logic
was effectuated with great proficiency:
A decisive characteristic of National Socialist theory was that emphasis
was placed less on the act committed than on the "criminal personality."
Legal scholars developed categories of "characteristic criminal types" for
use in the rewriting of laws and decrees; these "types," which were
determined by "simple and popular distinctions," came to play an ever
greater role .... 99
Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence ofState Supreme Courts
in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133, 1135-44
(1997).
96 In 1997, during the trial of Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh,
Congress and the President bowed to political pressure and changed the law to
guarantee the rights of victims who might later testify in the penalty phase of that
trial to attend the trial in chief. See Victim Allocution Clarification Act of 1997, 18
U.S.C. § 3510 (1997); see also H.R. REP. No. 105-28 (1997) ("Recently the
Committee has learned that, under the FederalRules of Evidence, some federal trial
judges may be able to exclude victims and witness' family members."); cf. United
States v. McVeigh, 106 F.3d 325 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. McVeigh, 958
F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1997) (discussing the Victim Allocution Clarification Act).
97NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 456.
See MOLLER, supra note 88, at 68-8 1; DETLEV J. K. PEUKERT, INSIDE NAZI
GERMANY: CONFORMITY, OPPOSITION, AND RACISM IN EVERYDAY LIFE 208-35
(Richard Deveson trans., 1987).
9 MOLLER, supra note 88, at 79.
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A complementary theme of Nazi reforms in criminal justice was to
restore an emphasis on the cognitive aspect of culpability, on mens rea and
moral fault, to the relative exclusion of the objective definition of crime
(actus reus). The logical conclusion of such an attitude is to expand an
already broad view of criminality to include matters of consciousness,
which the Nazis and many other oppressive regimes effectively used to
persecute political dissidents and potential enemies andto make awider net
of their conception of criminality.l°0 Finally, Neumann says, for the Nazis,
"[n]othing is left of the principle of nullapeona sine lega, nullem crimen
sine lege (no punishment without law and no crime without law)." '
Victims' rights shares these perspectives. For, in its own way, the
victims' rights movement faithfully advances a parallel vision of the
criminal, dominated by friend/enemy-like dualities: "normal vs. abnormal,
member vs. outsider, predator vs. preyed-upon.""0 2 Like the Nazis, victims'
rights advances this perspective with certain policies which criminalize
biological characteristics and which-as is the logical implication of such
practice-extend criminal sanctions into everyday civil society.
Notwithstanding the likelihood that it is influenced by a climate of
racism that pervades contemporary conceptions of crime, 0 3 we need not
delve into the question of whether the victims' rights movement is
affirmatively racist in order to demonstrate this concern. Rather, the resort
to biological definitions ofcriminality is abundantly clear from the victims'
rights movement's enthusiastic sponsorship of sex-offender community
notification statutes-so-called Megan's Laws." These statutes, which are
partially mandated by federal law and apply in some degree in every state,
require that a convicted sex offender, upon release or adjudication, (1)
publicize his arrival in a community and/or (2) register with local law
enforcement.I0 5 The underlying purposes of such laws are victim oriented:
'oo See Otto Kirschheimer, CriminalLaw in National Socialist Germany, in THE
RULE OF LAW UNDER SEIGE 172 (William E. Scheuerman ed., 1996).
101 NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 454.
02WEED, supra note 79, at 52.
103 See ELIAS, supra note 93, at 10-11.
4 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to -11 (West Supp. 1995).
105 See, e.g., PETER FINN, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
Sex Offender Community Notification, in RESEARCH IN ACTION (1997). Under
penalty of diminution of certain funding, federal law now requires all states to
develop such laws with respect to registration. See Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994 &
Supp. 11997).
Some 46 states and the federal government have registration programs, and
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to provide past andpotential victims with actual or constructive notification
and public access to information about the sex offender."° First enacted in
New Jersey as an "emergency" measure,107 Megan's Laws are rationalized
by courts and legislatures in two interlocking ways, each of which violates
rule of law and matches the Nazi perspective on criminal justice: first, by
reference to the supposed immutability or biological bases of criminality;
and second, by manipulating the legal definition of the programs to
demonstrate their ostensibly nonpunitive, "civil" nature.
In contemporary discourse, racial and biological explanations of social
phenomenon, like crime, have renewed appeal. 10 Most assuredly, a notion
of biological or otherwise immutable criminality, essentially indistinguish-
able from the Nazi approach to criminality, is a major assumption
underlying Megan's Laws. Sex offenders must be subjected to such
strictures because it is in their nature to commit sex crimes. The relevant
federal law makes this point all too clearly: "The term 'sexually violent
predator' means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
offense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes the person likely to engage in predatory sexually violent
approximately 15 states have community notification statutes. See generally John
Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil Detention of
SexualPredators, 53 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 1293, 1294-95 (1996) (justifying such
provisions).
In some cases, this idea is reduced to mandated pillory, as released convicts
may be expected to plant signs at their residence and identify themselves to their
neighbors either directly or through public media. See, e.g., Jonathan Alter & Pat
Wingert, The Return ofShame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 21; Russell Mokhiber,
Crime the Shame of It All: Shaming Rituals Work in Japan-Why Not Here in
America, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 1990, at C3.
"o See Community Notification of the Release of Sex Offenders, VICTIMS'
RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 82, § 3.1. As this document indicates, there are
differing degrees to which states attempt to implement these goals, with some states
placing greater emphasis on actual notification. See id.
107 See E. B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir.), reh "g denied, 127 F.3d
298 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998).
108 See, e.g., Wray Herbert, Politics ofBiology, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
21, 1997; James Popkin et al., NaturalBorn Predators, U.S.NEWS &WORLDREP.,
Sept. 19, 1994, at 64; cf RICHARD J. HERNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994)
(emphasizing how intellectual capacity shapes American society). On the poverty
of such arguments, see, for example, R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES:
BIOLOGY, IDEOLOGY, AND HUMAN NATURE (1985).
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offenses.""° This notion is accompanied by faith in the development of a
kind of public/private partnership to control sex offenders.110
Courts have generally used a nonpunitive, civil interpretation to ratify
these laws. So characterized, Megan's Laws fall outside the reach of ex
post facto and the more stringent due process structures. As such, they may
be applied not just indefinitely or for extended periods beyond the point
when the original sentence would have expired, but retroactively. These
109 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(C) (1994 & Supp. I. 1997).
110 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9791 (West Supp. 1998), cited in
Community Notification of the Release of Sex Offenders, VICTIMS' RIGHTS
SOURCEBOOK,supra note 82, § 3.1 (putting the public on notice about suchpersons
and protecting the "safety and general welfare... until effective treatment for sex
offenders can be found or until we can put a policeman on every street corner");
see also Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 1996) (Notification
provision is regulatory and therefore constitutional because it "is tailored to help
the community protect itself from sexual predators under the guidance of law
enforcement").
For what it is worth-and it should not matter with regard to rule of law
concerns-it is not at all clear that such assumptions about the supposedly very high
rates of recidivism of sex offenders are valid. See, e.g., ALLEN V. BECK, U.S.DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SPECIALREPORT: RECIDiVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983, 0 tbl.
8 (1983, rev'd 1997) (suggesting lower rates of recidivism among violent sex
offenders relative to other felons); LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 25-27 (1997) (suggesting lower rates of
recidivism among violent sex offenders relative to other felons).
111 See, e.g., Doev. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1284-85 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 1066 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1105 (3d Cir.), reh'g
denied, 127 F.3d 298 (1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct 1039 (1998); Neal v.
Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 825-27 (9th Cir. 1997); f Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81
F.3d 1235, 1262-67 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 83 F.3d 594 (3d Cir. 1996).
"Analyzing the registration provisions of Megan's Law... we conclude that
registration under Megan's Law does not constitute 'punishment' under any
measure of the term. Hence, it does not offend the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy,
or Bill of Attainder Clauses." Id. at 1267. The Artway court also rejected claims
that New Jersey's Megan's Law is unconstitutional because it is vague, violative
of equal protection, and violative of due process. See id. at 1271.
Some courts have vacillated on the question of punitiveness, particularly as
concerns retroactivity. See State v. Delaughter, 703 So. 2d 1364, 1370-71 (La. Ct.
App. 1997). However, no jurisdiction has rejected the basic idea of Megan's Law.
See Sex Offender Community Notification, supra note 105, at 15-16. Moreover,
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997), which characterized as "civil" a
policy of confining sex offenders, see id. at 2081-83, appears to have answered in
the negative questions of punitiveness and retroactivity for all other such regimes.
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statutes combine their biological or immutable conception of criminality
with a merger of the civil and criminal realms and, implicitly, of civil and
criminal sanctions. Thus, notwithstanding judicial rhetoric about the
nonpunitive nature of regimes such as Megan's Law, these statutes violate
the rule of law principle that civil society is to be a realm of negative
freedom from the state. Further, the merger of the civil and criminal
juxtaposes private and public authority over criminal affairs. By working
outside the criminal justice context, however, as with lynchings and witch
hunts, the authority of the state can only work to promote, and not restrain
or displace, private violence in essentially criminal areas." 2 At the same
time, the state evades the regulation of its conduct by rule of law, in this
instance by disguising its conduct as civil.
A recent landmark Supreme Court case, much applauded by victims'
rights advocates and quickly seized upon by lawmakers as an invitation to
further sexual predator legislation,"' validated once and for all the
abrogation of the civil/criminal distinction. The decision is Kansas v.
Hendricks,"4 where in 1997 the Court determined that even indefinite
"civil" confinement of a person inclined to commit "future predatory acts
of sexual violence" due to "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder"
because they "generally have anti-social personality features which are
unamenable to existing... treatment modalities""' 5 is constitutionally
permissible. The Court held that such a sanction is (1) permissible on
substantive due process grounds and (2) civil and not criminal, and
therefore incapable of violating either the ex post facto or double jeopardy
clauses." 6 As the Court acknowledges, such a statute potentially applies to
"
2 Already vigilantes have taken advantage of Megan's Law, in one instance
to assault the wrong person. See Sex-Offender Vigilantes, NAT'L L.L, Jan. 23,
1995, at A10.
13 See Ken Dilanian, Pennsylvania Sexual Predators Would Face Indefinite
Terms Under GOPBills, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 4, 1997, at B2; John Lantigua &
Mark Silva, New Curbs for Sex Predators: States Can Hold Them After Sentences,
Justices Rule, MIAMI HERALD, June 24,1997, at 1A; Christi Parsons, LawAims to
Jail Sex Predatorsfor Life: Repeat Offenders Could be Committed After Sentence
Served, CHI. TRm., Jan. 1, 1998, at 1.
14 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
1 5 Id. at 2076 (using criteria from the Sexually Violent Predator Act, KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29(a)(0l)-(02)).
"
6 See id. at 2086. Justice Breyer's dissent provides an analysis of other states'
statutory sexual predator commitment regimes. See id. at 2095 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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persons not convicted of any charge and sets forth rather paltry procedures
to determine an offender's status as a sexual predator."
7
The similarity with Nazi justice is clear. For the Hendricks Court, as
for Nazi courts, "the task of imposing drastic sanctions on asocial and
handicapped individuals without proceeding through criminal trials was
17 Of course, the facts of the Hendricks case completely contradict a civil
interpretation. Writing for a majority, Justice Thomas looked to colonial history to
reach "an understanding of ordered liberty" and proceeded to set forth a hodge
podge of reasons that the Court need not question the statute's weak notion of
"mental abnormality" nor question too deeply Kansas's dubious denomination of
the sanction as civil and not criminal. See id. at 2079-86. In overturning the statute,
the Kansas Supreme Court averred directly to the statute's casual definition of
mental illness. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133-38, cert. granted, 518 U.S.
1004 (1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). In fact, the sole credible reason for
extending the confinement of the Hendricks offender is one clearly within the
exclusive purview of modem criminal law: detention without any real pretense of
treating the offender for his dangerous propensities. The majority in this case, per
Justice Thomas, placed a "heavy burden" on the petitioner to show that a court
should disregard the mere denomination of a commitment regime as civil and not
criminal. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2082. Essentially, Justice Thomas's
methodology in this regard is a rather random analysis of the distinction between
civil and criminal and specifically between punitive and nonpunitive institutional
commitment-disregarding that the State of Kansas clearly had no intention of
doing anything but warehousing Hendricks on the theory that he is a permanent
threat to society.
It is interesting to compare the reasoning in Hendricks to that of an earlier
decision, Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), where the Court unanimously
invalidated a substantially similar law, which in its view made
one [proceeding] the basis for commencing another proceeding under
another Act to determine whether a person constitutes a threat of bodily
harm to the public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill. That is a new
finding of fact.... The punishment under the Second Act is criminal
punishment even though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to
keep individuals from inflicting future harm.
Id. at 608-09 (citations omitted). On all but the mosttechnical level, it is impossible
to distinguish this case from Hendricks. Cf Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488
(1997) (holding that monetary and disbarment sanctions represent civil penalties
for purposes of the double jeopardy clause).
As Justice Kennedy appears to recognize in his concurring opinion, the majority
ruling clearly expands the use of civil confinement to achieve criminal justice ends.
See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring). True to form, though,
Kennedy is careful to exempt Leroy Hendricks himself from this critique, hence his
concurrence. See id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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clearly not an unpleasant one for the judges concerned."' 18 Not only were
the Nazis too keen to embrace biological conceptions of criminality, but it
was likewise general practice for the Nazis to abrogate the distinctions
between civil and criminal society in the course of effectuating their racist,
inhumane dogma. Jews and other undesirables were, in effect, walking
criminals required to register, restricted in their travel, and committed to
ghettos before being shipped to concentration camps. Like sex offenders,
their crime was to exist, and their prisons were themselves, their physical
identity, and their very homes." 9 Actions centered around such a merger of
state and civil authority were a principal kind of violence under the Third
Reich. In this sense, as with Megan's Laws in particular, the Nazi
abrogation of the distinction between civil and criminal realms was
functionally related to facilitating the cooperation of state and private
parties in the extracriminal control of enemy groups.2
C. Private and Community Justice -
A curious thing about Nazi jurisprudence and fascism generally is the
syncretic tendency to juxtapose archaic, romantic, often ostensibly private
norms with conformist, authoritarian, and totalitarian norms. This
convoluted ideology sparked endless, fiuitless debates about whether
Nazism represents the refutation or the fulfillment of modernism,
liberalism, or capitalism.' 2' In the context of Schmitt's thought, this
MOLLER, supra note 88, at 125.
On the legal and political mechanics of this process, see MILLER, supra note
92. At least one U.S. court did compare the public notification aspect of (the
original) Megan's Law to Nazi practices with respect to Jews. See Artway v. New
Jersey, 876 F. Supp. 666, 687 (D.N.J. 1995).
120 Moreover, by the middle and latter days of the Third Reich, including within
ostensibly pacified occupied territories, a certain measure of anarchy reigned. In
such areas, the only supreme authorities with respect to the enforcement of state
policies and rights were the political (and to some degree nonmilitary) organs of
the state. At the same time, anarchy and fascist ideology bred private violence
which the German state, primarily through the SS (police and security forces) and
Gestapo (secret police), facilitated and otherwise exploited. See, for example, the
various accounts in THE GOOD OLD DAYS: THE HOLOCAUST As SEEN BY ITS
PERPETRATORS AND BYSTANDERS (Ernest Klee et al. eds., 1991). See also DANIEL
J. GOLDHAGEN, HITLER'S WILLINGEXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE
HOLOCAUST (1997) (discussing the executioners, participants, and victims of the
holocaust).
.. As in Hitler's own polemics, as well as those of his ideological minions, a
hyper-individualistic, anti-modem, vitalistic platform leads to the utter deprivation
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characteristic underlies an extensive debate about the actual degree of
Schmitt's Nazi tendencies." Scheuerman concludes that Schmitt's
inability to come to terms with the "dilemma of legal indeterminacy" drove
him to embrace Nazi doctrines and that this process reflects itself in
inconsistencies in Schmitt's thought, which, in turn, inform the
contemporary debate about his true politics. This unorthodox logic allows
Nazi ideology to claim to represent the perfection of both individualism
and community, of history and the future. However, the schizophrenic
character of Nazi thought facilitates the destruction of the individual as
well as whole communities servingnot historical orutopian ideals so much
as the present demands of power. Indeed, in the final analysis such patterns
in Nazi thought appear to constitute the inevitable byproduct of a social
order that deals withthe imperfect, dialectical structure of modern society,
not with ideas and faith in reason, but by attempting, by force, to obliterate
such contradictions."Z Thus, Nazi individualism and community represent
perverse, archaic interpretations of these concepts, steeped in obvious
racism and irrationalism, devoid of liberal universalism and legal general-
ity, and adept at justifying force.
As demonstrated above, a major characteristic of Nazi criminal justice,
particularly after its liberation from the civil/criminal distinction, the
strictures of courts, and the legal conception of criminality as such, was to
privatize and otherwise disperse the means of enforcement. A similar
function inheres in the victims' rights agenda not only with respect to sex
offender regimes but in victims' rights constitutional amendments in
particular. These amendments, now enacted in about forty states and
pending congressional action on the federal level, 24 are designed to expand
of individual freedom and the concomitant investiture of the state, as well as
individuals, with quasi-state sovereignty and the yolk with supreme existential
authority. See, e.g., HITLER, supra note 89; ALFRED ROSENBERG, THE MYTH OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1992). On the syncretic tendencies of fascist ideology
generally, see STANLEY G. PAYNE,FASCISM: COMPARISONAND DEFINITION (1980).
" On this debate, see William E. Scheuerman, After Legal Indeterminancy:
Carl Schmitt and the National Socialist Legal Order, 1933-1936, 19 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1743 (1998).
3 A classical study of this phenomenon is ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM
FREEDOM(1941), which explains the twentieth century affinity for authoritarianism
and totalitarianism as the inevitable outgrowth of the selective frustration of
individualism in modem society.
124 See LeRoy L. Lambom, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice
Process: The Proposals for a ConstitutionalAmendment, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 125,
128 (1987); see also Note, Passing the Victims' Rights Amendment: A Nation's
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the basic victims' rights agenda. Such expansions include the following
prominent rights: to attend and observe the trial; to receive mandatory
restitution; to receive a speedy trial; to be notified of developments in
the case, including settlement, sentencing, and sentencing relief; to be
notified of other victims' rights prerogatives; to receive certain communi-
cation with the prosecutor, including voicing objections to settlement,
sentencing, and sentencing relief; to give victim-impact testimony; and to
be afforded various amorphous incidents of "dignity" and "respect. 125 At
the core of such rights, as victims' rights proponents freely admit, is an
ambition to restore in some measure the institution of private
prosecutions. 6
The privatizing logic of this campaign is particularly salient in its push
for mandatory restitution. Contemplated in victims' rights amendments and
March Toward a More Perfect Union, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 647 (1998). The relevant federal legislation, which died upon
adjournment this fall of the 105th Congress, see S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. (1997),
has been reintroduced by Senators Kyl and Feinstein, see S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong.
(1999).
' Article I, section 30 of the Texas Constitution is typical:
(a) A crime victim has the following rights:
(1) the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the
victim's dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process; and
(2) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout
the criminal justice process.
(b) On the request of a crime victim, the crime victim has the following
rights:
(1) the right to notification of court proceedings;
(2) the right to be present at all public court proceedings related to the
offense, unless the victim is to testify and the court determines that
the victim's testimony would be materially affected if the victim
hears other testimony at the trial;
(3) the right to confer with a representative of the prosecutor's
office;
(4) the right to restitution; and
(5) the right to information about the conviction, sentence, im-
prisonment, and release of the accused.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30.
" See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 80, at 151 ("It is possible to envision a criminal
justice system under which private prosecutors would be revived.. .."); Lambom,
supra note 124 (discussing various amendments proposing to increase victim
"participation" in criminal proceedings); Gittler, supra note 80.
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otherwise widely mandated by statute,127 mandatory restitution folds the
adjudication of criminality into the civil tort, making the state's prosecution
the foil for private vindication of private rights. Indeed this can be
restitution's only function because, of course, private civil tort has always
been available apart from criminal liability and generally easier to prove.
The ambition to use restitution to conflate the tort and criminal regimes is
further evidenced by the ubiquitous veneration of pre-modem and pre-
Warren Court criminal justice, of the institution of private prosecution as
such, 28 and by an idealization of the renumerative tort law functions of the
criminal law that accompanies the advocacy ofrestitution: "Under existing
law, crime victims' rights are still too often overlooked. Even though the
law provides the means to address the rights of victims, the law does not,
however, provide for a means to make victims whole." 9
However rough the analogy to Nazism, in this privatizing aspect,
restitution directly contradicts the norm of generality. Obviously, the
criminal law cannot be administered in any general way, or even meaning-
fully written as such, if the victim is a legitimate party to the case,
empowered to stamp his or her demands upon the way the law is applied
and the various outcomes it yields.13°, Indeed, from the outset, such an
127 On the various models for restitution, see SEBBA, THIRD PARTY VICTIMS,
supra note 81, at 313-27. The issue of restitution has been addressed on the federal
level, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3663A (1994) (providing for, and in some cases
mandating, court-ordered restitution of victims by certain offenders); 42 U.S.C. §
10606 (1994) (enumerating statutory victims' rights, including the "right to
restitution"), and on the state level, see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (providing
crime victims with "the right to restitution"); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30 (providing
crime victims with "the right to restitution"). Cf 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §
2 (1981) ("The crime is held to constitute an offense against the public pursued by
the sovereign, whereas the tort is a private injury to be pursued by the injured
party."). For recent case law declaring that certain penalties were civil in nature and
therefore not violative of the double jeopardy clause, see Hudson v. United States,
118 S. Ct. 488 (1997), and United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
12 See Gittler, supra note 80, at 150-63.
129 H.R. REP. No 104-16, at 4 (1995) (House Judiciary committee report on the
Victim Restitution Act of 1995) (emphasis added).
130 Both courts and amendment drafters have been careful to limit the impact of
such rights. See, e.g., Dix v. Shasta County, 963 F.2d 1296, 1299-1301 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that the California Victims' Bill of Rights does not create authentic,
legally enforceable liberty interests in crime victims). Moreover, the test of most
victims' rights amendments and statutes is whether it expressly limits the capacity
of victims to enforce their rights against the state. Such restrictions are a source of
some tension between law and order victims' rights supporters and their allies (e.g.,
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ambition does more than put the defendant at a numerical advantage. It cuts
against the integrity of criminal justice as distinct from civil law and
therefore forecloses its functions as public general law. Such aprivatization
of criminal law functions insulates these functions from the rationalizing
norms-generality, for instance-which rule of law imposes much more
effectively in the public law context. As I anticipated earlier, the result is
.to deny rule of law the ability to regulate the conduct of the state. For in
this context, the shift toward a more private regime does not merely deprive
the defendant of certain benefits of rule of law, and not only serves the
interests of victims, but makes easier the prosecutorial functions of the
state-which, after all, retains its standing and prerogative.
Predictably, such an assault on the basic structure of rule of law in the
criminal context also has a collateral effect on other rule of law norms. In
particular, this follows because it is the nature of private right to facilitate
the expression of private differences. In other words, because private rights
are devoid of generality, arbitrary outcomes follow directly not merely
from restitution, but also from a broad panoply of victims' initiatives
premised on recentering the victim. These drastically different outcomes
become possible and become, in effect, part of the criminal sanction. The
only generality that can remain is what Neumann describes as false
generality: a dangerous reliance on "spurious generality," on the mere
standards of conduct which dominated the Third Reich's criminal law.
13
'
The possibility of arbitrariness advancedby these facets ofthe victims'
rights agenda exposes the fraudulence of both its commitment to the rights
of individual crime victims and its democratic pretensions. As with the
Nazi appeal to individualism and class equality, whichwere promptly stood
on their heads,132 agreeable rhetoric about individualized justice belies the
function of reprivatized criminal justice to restore fundamental inequality,
not merely among offenders, but among victims. As has always been the
case with private civil justice, the fruits of private prosecution naturally
accrue to the powerful and wealthy and replace rule by legal norms with
rule by exceptions. 133
prosecutors), on the one hand, and proponents of libertarian victims' rights, on the
other.
131 See NEUMANN, The Change in the Function ofLaw, supra note 12, at 27-29.
132 See, e.g., NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 42-43,452.
133 At least one authority has already chronicled the inegalitarian outcomes
among victims that private prosecutions create. See Joseph E. Kennedy, Private
Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections ofLiberty and
Equality in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665 (1997)
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The complement of such attempts to rprivatize criminal justice is the
ubiquitous appeal to community and to a community-based system of
criminal justice, which has a definite similarity to Nazi practices. Within
the context of victims' rights, this sentiment is generally evident in the
ethic of solidarity among victims,134 the authenticity of which at least one
commentator has questioned.1 35 More specifically, this attitude inheres in
the outermost logic of Megan's Laws, which are premised, as I have
anticipated, on developing the ability of communities to police themselves.
Notably, as the approving language of a congressional report reveals (again
in conformance with the Nazi practice), this focus on community can be
traced back to the fixation with biological or otherwise immutable causes
of criminality.
Sex offenders have a high likelihood ofreoffending-in fact, they are nine
times more likely to repeat their crimes than any other class of criminal.
It is for this reason that so many communities feel unsafe as long as
convicted sex offenders are in their midst, and why more and more
communities are seeking to know of their whereabouts. 3 6
Or, in the words of one senator, "Society needs to know where these
predators are at all times" in order that it might exercise its right of "self-
defense." 137
Of course, the racial community was a centerpiece of Nazi ideology
and the corollary of its mania to identify criminal types and enemy races
and achieve racial purity. Indeed, the very nature of criminal sanction was
construed in terms of whether a defendant was to remain within or to be
ejected from the volk.38 With respect to Jews especially, the first priority
for the Nazis was to identify such persons (by their loose conceptions of
criminality), and having done so, to initiate a campaign of repression that
prominently featured a registration requirement, social ostracism, civil
(describing the practice of private funding of criminal prosecutions). On the history
and impropriety of private prosecutions, see Bessler, supra note 55.
134See, e.g., GEORGEP. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FORSOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS
IN CRIMINAL TRIALS (1995) (stating that the fundamental purpose of criminal trials
as "communitarian" and to "stand by the victim").
'
35 See Shapiro, supra note 82.
136 H.R. REP. No. 105-256, at 6-7 (1997) (House Judiciary Committee Report
on the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children Act).
137 142 CONG. REc. S3484-85 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hutchison).
'
38 See MOLLER, supra note 88, at 77-78.
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death, and politically and judicially sanctioned private or otherwise extra-
legal violence. This action was invoked-particularly in the case of private
violence-in the name of defending the community.'39
Such was the relationship between the Nazi notions of community and
private right: the two converged to facilitate the inhumane, authoritarian
ends of the state vis-4-vis its enemies. In the context of victims' rights the
same basic function is served by empowering communities and private
citizens and the same elements of rule of law-generality, formality, the
segregation of civil and criminal society and public and private
functions-are violated. The community of victims polices itself (for
example, against sex offenders) and, without in any way limiting the
criminal authority of the state, relieves the state of the practical and legal
(including rule of law-oriented) burdens of exercising that authority.
D. Vengeance and the Nature ofPunishment
The idea that the friend/enemy construct defines the social sphere
works to legitimate irrational and intersocial violence. If identifiably
"different" or "alien," the enemy becomes subject to the most ruthless,
often barbaric treatments. In Nazi criminal justice, this perspective
converged with its dubious notions of criminality and the boundaries of the
criminal realm tojustifyvery broad definitions of criminality. With respect
to Jews and leftists, especially, the.persecution of such enemies was
practiced in the spirit of revenge for the supposed exploitation of non-Jews
by Jews and for communists' and socialists' supposed complicity with
enemies of Germany. The overall Nazi attitude on criminal punishment was
to demand "harshness" above all else. As one Nazi jurist proclaimed:
We have from the beginning emphasized that the National Socialist State
knows no humanitarian scruples so far as the criminal is concerned.
National Socialism stands in the position of a state of war against criminal
elements. I can give you the assurance, gentlemen, that the National
Socialist jurist is a fanatical exponent of the principle of reprisal, of
intimidation. 14°
Further, Neumann tells us, the idea of criminal types is rearticulated by the
Nazis in terms of specific categories worthy of specific degrees of
See ILLER, supra note 92, at 4.14 1 Id. at 51-52.
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punishment: brutal criminal, state criminal, habitual offenders, and so
forth.' 4'
For victims' rights, a certain analogous attitude appears. Having largely
embraced the notion of criminals as predators, the next step is to seize upon
the idea of vengeance. Restitution and participation are but the more
civilized aspects of this tendency which encompass the reactionary,
vindicative attitude ab6ut the purposes of criminal justice in general and
the expectations of certain victims in particular. Much of the popular voice
of victims' rights is dominated by a fixation with revenge and vindication
as the legitimate means and ends of criminal justice.'42 As one of its most
lucid and rigorous proponents confesses, the retributive ideal is intrinsic to
victims' rights. 143
Another, perhaps more straightforward, example of the tendency of
victims' rights to implement its tough demands on criminals is with its
zealous support forhabitual offender statutes. Here we find a more specific
replication of Nazi criminal justice; it seems that Nazi criminal law relied
extensively on such provisions.'" Often propagated as "three-strikes and
you're out" or codified as sentencing guidelines,' 45 these provisions
increase sentences on the basis of prior convictions or other conduct and
are the logical extension of a belief in the immutable or otherwise
permanent nature of criminality. The enemy appears here as "predator" or
"career criminal" who maybe identified by his or her pattern of criminality
and who must be, beyond a certain point, removed from society perma-
nently."4 In contemporary usage, it should be noted, the results are of
questionable practical effectiveness and notoriously absurd in many
cases.
147
41 See NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 457.
142 See, e.g., Sharon Brownlee et al., The Place for Vengeance, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., June 16, 1997, at 25; Dan McGraw, When Is Forgiveness
Unforgivable, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 9, 1998, at 7; Shapiro, supra note
82, at 11-12.
141 See Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal Process, supra note 80.
'44 See MOLLER, supra note 88, at 79-8 1.
45 See, e.g., FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 4A1.3 (1992).
,
46 See, e.g., JOHN CLARK ETAL., NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, "THREE STRIKES
AND YOU'RE OUT": A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 4-5 (1997).
,
47 See Angie Cannon, "Three-Strikes" Laws, Aren't Affecting Crime, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 10, 1996, at A3; Sam Walker, Questions Surface Over Fairness,
Cost of3-Strikes Laws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1994, at 3; Daniel B.
Wood, L.A. Police Lash Out Against 'Three-Strikes,' CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Mar. 29, 1996, at 3. It appears that no matter how disproportionate, such provisions
[VOL. 87
VICTIMS' RIGHTS
Moreover, like the Nazis, who embraced archaic punishments like
public pillory and the massive application of capital punishment,1
48 victims'
rights also associates itself with archaic punishments. Most notably,
Megan's Laws in particular operate as a kind of public pillory. If not for
any specific belief in such punishments, this penchant follows from the
ubiquitous desire of victims to influence the content of criminal justice. For
example, when a victim's relative has been murdered, the idea of capital
punishment or even torture is but the natural end result of the notion that
the victim has rights over the disposition of the case.
Perhaps the most pervasive example of the urge to control punishment
is the promotion by victims' rights advocates of habitual offender statutes.
The pretense of uniformity and predictability notwithstanding, such
regimes continue the opposition to rule of law. Ironically, only in a limited
sense are predictability and uniformity enhanced by minimum sentencing.
Experience shows that what these practices actually do is give further
affront to rule of law by relocating discretion and the source of arbitrariness
in the process from judges, who are at least nominally impartial, to the
extrajudicial offices of police prosecutors and-at least the proponents
hope-victims. 14 9 It is left to these parties to decide the charge and therefore
sentencing. This duty is accomplished by reference, in the case of
prosecutors, to political pressures, and in the case of victims, to subjective,
arbitrary factors. Indeed, so definite is this process that, even where
reduced by statute to guidelines, minimum sentencing regimes specifically
rest on arbitrary, victim-specific factors.' 51
Quite similar in both purpose and effect are statutes that repeal pardon,
parole, commutation, and other kinds of sentencing relief. The victims'
rights movement and other anti-crime factions have embraced this agenda
as "truth in sentencing." Again, a perverse result belies the rhetoric of
uniformity.15 1 The effect is an almost wholly random-and often quite
are not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
'
41 See MICHAEL BURLEIGH & WOLFGANG WIPPERMANN, THE RACIAL STATE:
GERMANY, 1933-1945, at 172-82 (1991); MOLLER, supra note 88, at 68-81;
NEUMANN, RULE OF LAW, supra note 17, at 293-98.
"I Cf ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 6, at 45 (discussing the
notion of institutional "nullification" of rule of law).
15 0 See LOIS G. FORER, A RAGE TO PUNISH: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
OF MANDATORY SENTENCING (1994). See also the federal sentencing guidelines,
18 U.S.C. § 4A1.3, which repeatedly invoke victim-specific characteristics like
age, official capacity, injury sustained, etc. See ALLEN, THEHABITS OFLEGALITY,
supra note 6, at 35, 73-77.
" We are told, for example, by the House of Representatives Judiciary
Committee, in its report on the "Crimes Against Children and Elderly Persons
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extraordinary-increase in expectedperiods of incarceration, applying with
special arbitrariness to inmates who are affected retroactively.5 2 More
ironically still, the inevitable overcrowding effect has generated unexpected
results of the opposite kind: another revolving door, the sudden release by
courts and wardens of some prisoners en masse to accommodate the need
for bed space.5 3 Of course, although pardon and parole are not liberty
interests as such, for the time being these practices remain subject to due
process and ex post facto restrictions on the manner of their application.'54
E. Perversion of Substantive Rule ofLaw Norms and the
Delegitimation ofRule ofLaw
More generally, how is the destruction of rule of law justified by Nazis
or victims' rights advocates? Notably, neither Schmitt nor the Nazis
generally styled themselves as agents of the utter destruction of positive
social ideals and-norms as such. Even Mein Kampfextolls the universal
triumph of the personality.155 Ifi their focus on liberalism and law, Schmitt
Increased Punishment Act," that "[o]nly a uniform approach which communicates
society's intolerance for these heinous crimes will provide sufficient deterrence."
H.R. REP. NO. 104-548, at 2 (1996).
152 It should be noted that such retroactivity is permissible only with respect to
"procedural" aspects ofthe parole process-which, of course, can entail a great deal.
See, e.g., California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995), on
remand, 56 F.3d 46 (9th Cir. 1995).
113 See, e.g., Rena Singer, 'Musical Inmates,' Desperate Prisons, Jail
Overcrowding Has Hit Suburbia, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 25, 1997, at B1.
" On the kind of liberty interests created by pardon and parole, see generally
Connecticut Board ofPardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981), Greenholtz v.
Inmates ofNebraska, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972).
The power to pardon is generally construed as the exclusive province of the
executive branch, thus protected by separation of powers from legislative or
judicial appropriation. Since the constitutional doctrine of separation ofpowers has
not been extended to the states, the composition of the Nevada Board of Pardons
is not subject to challenge under the doctrine. See Bean v. State of Nevada, 410 F.
Supp. 963 (D. Nev. 1974), aJfd, 535 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1976). On the limitations
imposed by the Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses on deprivations of parole
related interests, see, for example, Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 517 U.S. 1219 (1996), affirmed, 117 S. Ct. 1148 (1997), and
Newburyv. PrisonerReviewBoard, 791 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Thomas
3. Bamonte, The Viability ofMorrissey v. Brewer and the Due Process Rights of
Parolees and Other Conditional Releasees, 18 S. ILL. U. L.. 121 (1993).
55See HITLER, supra note 89, at 660-72.
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and other Nazis were careful to claim that they had come not to destroy but
to perfect the law. In Neumann's view, "National Socialism takes
advantage of the incompleteness of the liberal ideas of freedom and
equality. It charges that freedom and equality are cloaks behind which
exploitation is hidden." '156 In Schmitt, this attitude is particularly evident.
His critique of liberalism in The Concept of the Political often references
liberalism's supposed traitorship of its own ideals: individualism, liberty,
rationality, and the promise of social wealth.1 7 Here, too, Schmitt regards
the redemption of the political as a prerequisite to the redemption of the
state's historical virtues and of conservative ideals in general.5 8 Indeed, the
traditional jurisprudence of the German historical school, which came to
some fruition in the Nazi era, is premised squarely on the idea of recaptur-
ing a legal order consistent with the spirit of the German people. This
ambition is invariably articulatedwith a ratherperverse appeal to the "true"
virtues of law as such. This logic is evident in the words of the Nazi law
professor, Ernst Huber:
Formal equality cannot be the deciding factor for the law-giver. Its place
is taken by the material equality of vdlkisch law which grows out of the
experience of the equality ofa common vdlkisch nature. This new concept
of equality enables us to distinguish in the legislative sphere as well the
alien from our own character, the hostile from the loyal to the community,
the subversive from the constructive forces, while the relativism of
pervious formalistic philosophy would have required equal treatment of
these elements.'59
As noted, the perversion of rule of law norms is attendant to restitution
and minimum sentencing. This perverse logic also appears in proponents'
characterization of victims' rights as a return to the historical essence of
criminal justice. Indeed, far from incidental, the appeal to history is
ubiquitous in victims' rights rhetoric, typifying both ground level and
academic discourse. 60
More commonly appealed to in this justifying role, though, is the norm
of equality, which in victims' rights rhetoric is framed in terms of
156 NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 452.
15 7 See SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL, supra note 3, at 69-77.
"' See id. at 21-23; see also NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 42 ("[For
Schmitt,] equality is its [democracy's] substance, not liberty.").
159 NAZISM: A DOCUMENTARY READER, supra note 89, at 477.
"6 See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note 80; Gittler, supra note 80; Hudson, supra
note 80; McDonald, supra note 80.
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"balance" and "fairness." Such arguments are, in fact, ubiquitous, forming
what writer and violent crime victim Bruce Shapiro calls "an article of
faith" for the whole movement. 161 One of many examples of this attitude
appears in the watershed-and often quoted-1982 Report of the President's
Task Force on Victims of Crime:
[Victims] discover instead that they will be treated as appendages of a
system appallingly out of balance. They have learned that somewhere
along the way the system has lost track of the simple truth that it is
supposed to be fair and to protect those who obey the law while punishing
those who break it.'62
In a 1996 speech announcing his support for a federal victims' rights
amendment, President Clinton lent his voice to a common chorus when he
said that such an amendment is necessary, in part, to right a system that
"bends over backwards to protect those who may be innocent" while
ignoring innocent victims. 163 With equal certainty, the demand for balance
is rehashed by legal scholars. 16 As one set of authors suggests, victims'
rights is essential to overcoming the "tremendous weight accorded
defendants' rights, in our criminal justice system."' 65 Indeed, for most
scholars who advocate victims' rights, historical and "balancing" argu-
ments are lumped together, apparently to better underscore the supposed
legitimacy of victims' rights. 166
161 Shapiro, supra note 82, at 13.
162 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT at vi
(1982).
163 President's Remarks Announcing Support for a Constitutional Amendment
on Victims' Rights, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. DOC. 1134 (July 1, 1996).
' For law professor and victims' rights ideologist Paul Cassell, the restoration
ofprivate criminaljustice again contemplates a search for lost balance. See Cassell,
supra note 80, at 1379-82; see also Gittler, supra note 80; Hudson, supra note 80.
"Victim's rights acts and individual laws designed to protect victims seek to
balance a system that has, in the past, focused solely on the rights of the accused."
DEBRA J. WILSON, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF VICTIMS' RIGHTS at vi. (1995).
165 Don Siegelman & Courtney W. Tarver, Victims' Rights in State Con-
stitutions, in EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 163-75 (1988).
' See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note 80, at 33 ("In colonial times, a person
suspected of a crime was at the mercy of a system that was weighted heavily in
favor of the Crown. Today, it is victims who are treated unfairly, whose interests
and needs are likely to be ignored.").
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Similar rhetoric surfaces in judicial opinions, of which Payne v.
Tennessee,67 the landmark Supreme Court case which overturned
established precedent to remove any constitutional impediment to victim
impact testimony, is a good example. Justice Rehnquist deemed the
contrary precedent "unfair"; 68 Justice O'Connor concurred, insisting on
effectuating "societal consensus";169 Justice Scalia also concurred,
declaring the old rule an "injustice" upon the people; 7' and, finally, Justice
Souter in his concurring opinion insisted on rectifying the "arbitrariness"
of the old rule. 7' Here, the perfection of the rule of law is contemplated by
the supposed ability of victim impact testimony to rectify both the rule of
law's substantive and procedural shortfalls."7
A close cousin of the appeal to balance and fairness is the argument
that victims' rights is mandated because it fulfills populist, democratic
ideals. For instance, President Clinton proclaimed that "[w]hen someone
is a victim, he or she should be at the center of the criminal justice process,
not on the outside looking in. Participation in all forms of government is
the essence of democracy.... ."'3 For another commentator, the federal
victims' rights amendment is necessary to craft "a more perfect union."'174
The National Governors' Association wrapped up a similar sentiment in
common sense jargon:
167 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
161 Id. at 826.
169 Id. at 830 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
170 Id.'at 833 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 839 (Souter, J., concurring). The issue in Payne was the admissibility
of such testimony at capital sentencing hearings. CompareBoothv. Maryland, 482
U.S. 496, 507-507 (1987) (prohibiting the state from introducing victim impact
evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital prosecution because such evidence is
irrelevant, prejudicial, and liable to create more arbitrariness), with South Carolina
v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (holding that the victim's personal characteristics
are irrelevant to sentencing).
17 With a somewhat varied logic, other courts have essentially dogmatized the
formalist implications of the rule of law to justify victims' rights-that is,
misconstrued rule of law for rule by law. In cases like Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp.
603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid inpart, rev'd inpart, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997),
which validated New York's Megan's Law, this logic surfaces as blind deference
to legislative sovereignty to confnim the nonpunitive-and therefore, civil-nature
of the underlying policy.
" President's Remarks Announcing Support for a Constitutional Amendment
on Victims' Rights, supra note 163.
"4 Note, supra note 124, at 648.
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These rights are not outrageous or extreme. They are common sense,
basic, and natural. The Governors recognize the need for constitutional
guarantees, as do victims and potential victims of crimes. These rights
give bereaved victims a chance to grieve as they struggle to overcome
insuperable inner torment. They provide away for our nation to heal itself
through its strongest resource: its people. 175
The primary problem with such arguments about equality, balance, and
populism is not any manifest falsity. However, it does strain credulity to
think that somewhere between the present day and the birth ofthis country,
criminal offenders and defendants somehow possessed an absolute surplus
of rights, or that there existed in the pre-Warren Court days anything
approaching a rational criminal justice system. Rather, the real problem
with such arguments is that they function to circumvent the unresolved
jurisprudential problems with the various victims' rights prop osals. In other
words, to say that the system is out of balance blithely and falsely assumes
that it is supposed to achieve balance between parties, much less between
victims and offenders, rather than conform to any jurisprudential mandates.
Probably a more perverse kind of argument, though, is the defense of
victims' rights on the broadest substantive rule of law grounds: as the
fulfillment of justice and freedom under the law. In a "sample speech"
prepared by the Department of Justice's Office for Victims of Crime and
designed for use during National Criminal Victims' Rights Week, we get
the following argument:
Victim Justice: What do these two words mean in America in 1996? They
mean, first and foremost, that victims of crime only want to be treated as
well as the alleged and convicted offenders. They mean that victims
should be treated with dignity, compassion and respect, not only by our
justice system, but by all individuals with whom they have contact in the
aftermath of crime. 1
76
175 NATIONALGOVERNORSASS'N,POLICYPOSrrIoNS, FEBRUARY 1998 (1998).
176 OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Sample Speech, in 1996
NATIONAL CRIMEVICTIMS' RIGHTS WEEKRESOURCE GUIDE (1996); cf OFFICEOF
THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF DELAWARE, STATEMENT IN OBSERVANCE OF CRIME
VICTIMS' RIGHTS WEEK (1997) ("[A] nation devoted to liberty and justice for all
... must increase its efforts to promote, restore and expand victims' rights....").
As one victim exclaimed, given a scholarly forum, "JUSTICE FOR ALL...
EVEN THE VICTIM." Betty Jane Spencer, A Crime Victim's Views on a
Constitutional Amendmentfor Victims, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 6 (1987).
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Or even more revealingly, another pair of writers informs us that:
Justice is one of those words-like love orhappiness-that's hard to define.
But everyone knows what it means. Justice has to do with getting what
one deserves. It has to do with the hope that in the long run good people
will be rewarded and bad people will be punished. Among personal crime
victims the belief in a just world is often translated into a wish for
"satisfaction." Since they have been aggrieved, it is natural for victims to
expect-on some level-that their grievances will be avenged. Anyone who
has been injured by another has a normal desire to get even. 1"
Such arguments typify the scholarship in support of victims' rights, where
the appeal to justice is ubiquitous. 17 8 Indeed, the best that scholars who
support victims' rights can do to define the meaning of justice in this
context does no more than restate the above-quoted notion of justice as
some type of revenge. 179
Justice is therefore no more than what victims' rights needs its to be:
a backward notion of retribution. Significantly, this norm is imported into
the vision of its legality and only emerges in a specious way from within
the rule of law construct. The failure of rule of law in the criminal context
to provide justice and equality is turned, in a way that Neumann specifi-
cally cautioned against, into a dubious demand for their true fulfillment.
This demand can only be satisfied in an exogenous, extralegal, and
thoroughly political way. In this respect, the appeal of victims' rights to
justice andbalance closely replicates Schmitt's demands for true freedom,
equality, and legal determinacy.180
In the end, these presumptions of legality and legitimacy are the most
dangerous and most problematic aspect of the agenda of victims' rights
from a rule of law standpoint. They exemplify rule of law's continuous
vulnerability to self-destruction. For, unlike any straightforward assault,
such presumptions employ rule of law norms to suppress the otherwise
obvious fact that rule of law is inconsistent with victims' rights. Rule of
177 MORTON BARD & DAWN SANGREY, THE CRIME VICTIM'S BOOK 103-04
(1979) (footnote omitted); see also ROBERT REIF, THE INVISIBLE VICTIM: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S FORGOTTEN RESPONSIBILITY 131-36 (1979).
" See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note 80; Hudson, supra note 80, at 36-37; Note,
At Least Treat Us Like Criminals: South Carolina Responds to Victims' Pleas for
EqualRights, 49 S.C. L. REv. 575 (1998).
179 See, e.g., Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal Process, supra note 80.
See NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4, at 443-44.
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law is not repudiated but, instead, reduced to a grab bag of so many
disparate norms which, with so many contrary functions, satisfy the needs
of strictly political, nonjurisprudential arguments. In such a role, the
construct can have no overall coherence. In fact, in as much as the appeals
to such disjointed norms contradict the coherence of rule of law, such
appeals work to actively undermine rule of law's very capacity for critical
meaning. If, as is the case with victims' rights, justice or balance promote
the destruction of generality or equality, or if a campaign for uniformity (as
with minimum sentencing) is normatively self-contradictory (recreating
discretion in the name ofunifortuity), then rule of law itself can be nothing
more than the grist of a political struggle for power and vindication
divorced at all points-most notably in the scholarship-from any questions
of jurisprudential propriety. In the light of day, its norms become no more
than proof of certain political views and its promoters reduced to raw
political players. Here lies proof of the weakness of dialectic, the political
vulnerability of rule of law in history, and the deeper threat posed by
victims' rights to liberal jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION: IS THERE A WAY
TO RECONCILE VICTIMS' RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW?
This analysis suggests very clearly the fundamental poverty of the
victims' rights agenda. It is apparent that, as articulated and in very many
overlapping respects, victims' rights comprises a latter day fulfillment of
the horrible ideas of Schmitt and the jurisprudential agenda of the Nazi
state. On a very fundamental level, victims' rights is inconsistent and
incompatible with a coherent model of liberal jurisprudence based on rule
of law. It is an irrational, archaic, and ultimately unsupportable idea which
seems to exemplify what Erich Fromm called an "escape from freedom":
the willing rejection of bourgeois liberties because they are not and cannot
be perfect within the prevailing social historical context.'81
Yet, the present critique applies to victims' rights in its main aspects
and as it actually exists-and in particular as an element of the criminal
law-not to the concept of assisting victims on the most general level.
Victims' rights' incompatibility with rule of law, in fact, appears to derive
directly from the stubborn attempt to introduce itself into the criminal law
and from the "war on crime" fetish to deal with all possible social problems
criminally.1
82
18 See FROMM, supra note 123.
"8 On this fetish for criminalization, see ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY,
supra note 6, at 91.
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The idea of aiding victims generally and apart from criminal justice is
actually not difficult to justify in a manner consistent with rule of law. The
past century of the welfare state has demonstrated the basic compatibility
of rule of law with a social order that distorts the classically distinct
relationships among civil, political, and legal society. This interaction
exerts at least some pressure on the rule of law. Unlike victims' rights,
though, these previous compromises have avoided a truly destructive
challenge to rule of law and have stayed away from contexts like criminal
justice with its inherently irrational, complex, and violent character.
Moreover, the welfare state, unlike criminal justice, principally trades not
in raw power and coercion, but in the more rational articles of fungible
wealth. To the extent that its compromises have exposed rule of law to any
threat, they were also wrested from entities like corporations, business
classes, and even trade unions, which are all fundamentally more powerful
and legally resilient than criminal defendants and offenders. While the
welfare state accomplishes-albeit not without some problems-an increase
in social equality and cohesion, victims' rights does just the opposite.
Indeed, the key function of the traditional welfare state is to publicize,
bureaucratize, and basically rationalize the costs of modem capitalist
society. This function helps facilitate society's accommodation to rule of
law by undermining the sources ofprivate and communal power. The costs
of compromising rule of law in this context are largely redeemed by
advancing rule of law norms in other respects (e.g., in the interests of
democracy)-a notion explored by a wide range of theorists, from liberals
like Mill and Rawls to John Hart Ely to Neumann himself.183
This state of affairs suggests that a reconceptualization of victims'
rights as a mode of public social welfare, segregated from the criminal
justice process, maypresent an opportunityto salvage the idea andpreserve
its consistency with rule of law. I merely propose, for the sake of future
argument, the idea of victims' rights in the form of public assistance (e.g.,
reparations, free mental andphysical health services, and so forth) divorced
from criminal justice altogether.184 For private vindication, there remains
183 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); SCHEUERMAN, supra note 3 (commenting on efforts by
Neumann, Otto Kirschheimer, and Scheuerman himself to broach the optimal
connection between rule of law and democracy).
184 See SEBBA, THIRD PARTYVICTIMS, supra note 81, at 20-21, 331-36. Sebba
invokes a distinction between, inter alia, "adversary-retribution" and "social
defense-welfare" models of victims' rights, which, although they do not overlap
my conception entirely, donate an awareness in the scholarship of the distinction.
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the civil tort, but there is not a place for victims in the criminal justice
process.
A related issue raised by this discussion concerns the appropriate
function of rule of law generally in contemporary society. Not by accident
do Schmitt and his fellow Nazis, like contemporary "critical" leftist
scholars like Roberto Unger and the victims' rights movement, make rule
of law accountable for the significant questions about the fate of reason in
modem society.' Not only do Neumann and Allen warn against this, but,
as Marx demonstrates, this is the way to simultaneously negate rule of law
and ignore the real bases of social reason and its deprivation.8 6 Such
practice trades every possibility of maintaining a clear focus on the value
of-and the distinction between-legal and political responses to questions
of criminal justice for an unbounded, populist, eventually nihilistic
perspective whose logic is not only irrational and illiberal but incipiently
authoritarian.
In closing, it would be premature, unfair, and concede too much to the
power of law to conclude that victims' rights, through its erosion of rule of
law, will cause a Nazi-like or otherwise fascistic turn. As is widely
recognized, the causes of such movements are complex, largely economic,
and nonlegal. For all his attention to legal questions, even Neumann was
concerned primarily with nonlegal causes in his attempts to explain the
origins of Nazism. 187 But, it is clear that, as the specter of Nazism drove
Neumann to emphasize the value of rule of law, so now must the prospect
of criminal justice gutted by victims' rights inspire a renewed appreciation
of the rule of law as the foundation of criminal justice and liberal jurispru-
dence generally. The jurisprudential kinship of Nazism and victims' rights
is simply too thorough to ignore. It must at least be asked, what are the
broader implications of a society that, as evidenced by the judicial
ratification of Megan's Laws and other victims' rights initiatives,
185 As I have noted, Schmitt's specific strategy is to unmask rule of law as a
fraudulent pretense, unable to escape the fundamental irrationality ofpolitical life.
Thus, his own fraud in pretending to reveal the irrationality of law is impossible to
excuse. See, e.g., SCHMrrT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLrrICAL, supra note 3, at 72-
79.
"
86 See Marx, supra note 11, at 221. In the same spirit, Lukdcs cautions against
forcing the cause of reason in the wrong historical moment or institutional context:
"The impossibility of comprehending and 'creating' the union of form and content
concretely instead of as the basis for a purely formal calculus leads to the insoluble
dilemma of freedom and necessity, of voluntarism and fatalism." LUKACS, supra
note 17, at 134.
187 See generally NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH, supra note 4.
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recognizes no firm distinction at all between civil and criminal sanctions
and convicts and free people? What are the broader implications of a casual
attitude toward separation ofpowers orjudicial independence? What might
be the final results of a subjectified notion of guilt? Finally, what does it
mean to do all of this without any concern for rule of law, if not to open the
door to the lawlessness and raw power equations of fascist rule? The
possibilities are too frightening to risk.

